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1273 
“AN EVER CLOSER UNION”? IN 
CORPORATE IDENTITY?:   
A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
REGIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE SOCIETAS 
EUROPAEA 
JODIE A. KIRSHNER† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Upper and lower legal levels interact in both the United 
States and Europe in the field of corporate law.  In the U.S., a 
dynamic exists between the federal government and the states.  
While the U.S. Congress has tacitly delegated corporate law to 
state legislation, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
continues to authorize the federal government to act.1  During its 
periodic entrances into the field, the federal government has 
preempted the laws of individual states.2  In Europe, a similar 
 
? Treaty Establishing the European Community, Preamble, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 15. 
† The author wishes to thank Simon Deakin, Professor of Law at the University 
of Cambridge; the ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge; 
Denis Galligan, Professor of Socio-Legal Studies and Director of the Centre for Socio-
Legal Studies, University of Oxford; the UK Fulbright Commission; the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany; Paul 
Davies, Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law, University of Oxford; and 
Katharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. 
McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 619, 624 (2006) (“The pattern of restraint does not follow from a constitutional 
mandate . . . .”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of 
Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 26 (“The question of who gets to 
regulate public corporations thus is not one of constitutional law but rather of 
prudence and federalism.”). 
2 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. 
L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm 
(2006)); Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2006)); Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1978) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2006)). This has led to calls for 
new models of federalism, in which the state and federal levels would explicitly 
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dynamic operates between the European Union (“EU”) and its 
Member States; the attempts by the EU to develop a legal 
apparatus, split between regional3 and national levels, parallel 
the division of federal and state responsibilities in the U.S.  The 
EU, however, has had to act in a more measured style:  
Beginning with its earliest directives and continuing through its 
recent, framework initiatives, Europe has reserved to its Member 
States significantly more discretion to tailor regional goals to 
local environments.4 
The U.S. has refined its legal approach to corporate identity, 
based on shared values and integrated legislative, judicial, and 
political systems among the states over the last two hundred 
years.  Two legal precedents have supported the operations of 
national business:  Paul v. Virginia,5 a nineteenth century U.S. 
Supreme Court case, established that states may not burden out-
of-state companies with additional regulations; and Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence6 outlawed state legislation that 
discriminated against companies from other states.7 
Companies in Europe, however, have not, until recently, 
been able to merge internationally or reincorporate in a different 
country.8  The European Member States demonstrate a wide 
variation in attitudes towards labor rights, shareholder  
 
 
 
 
interact, especially in reaction to the “dualistic” view of federalism espoused by the 
Rehnquist Court in its preemption caselaw. See also Robert Schapiro, Toward a 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). 
3 “Regional,” for this purpose, refers simply to the European level and not to 
specific “regions” of Europe, such as the “Benelux region.” 
4 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 
340), art. 249, para. 3 (noting that “[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods”). 
5 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States”). 
7 But see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200–01 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (denouncing the Dormant Commerce Clause and seeking to 
limit it to facially discriminatory local and state taxes). 
8 See, e.g., CARLA TAVARES DA COSTA & ALEXANDRA DE MEESTER BILREIRO, THE 
EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 1 (2003); see also Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of 
the Company’s Seat in European Company Law, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 661, 690 
(2003). 
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protections, corporate taxation, and other legal areas, making the 
task of integration confronting Europe far greater than in the 
U.S.9 
Significant changes are taking place in Europe, however.  
The European Union has recently implemented a transnational, 
pan-European form for corporate law, the Societas Europaea 
(“SE”).10  With the SE, the EU has attempted to craft a corporate 
identity out of separate systems, in order to enable European 
companies to operate more seamlessly across the region.11  While 
the initial purpose of the SE was to provide a complete set of 
European corporate law rules, political differences made doing so 
impossible.12  A framework structure, containing numerous 
references to national law, replaced the concept of a single set of 
harmonized rules.13  Effectively, thirty distinct types of SEs have 
 
9 See, e.g., Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European Corporate Laws, 
Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 47, 61 (2002).  
A comparison between the corporate laws in the US and in the EU shows 
that the diversity between European corporate laws is much larger than 
between the corporate laws of the federal states in the US. Whereas it was 
shown that in Europe the national corporate laws belong to several 
different legal paradigms, the corporate laws in the US have, despite 
important differences, so many central features in common that it is 
reasonable to characterise the US corporate laws as being based upon the 
same legal paradigm. 
Id. For additional authority, see also W. Loeber Landau, The Federal and State 
Roles in Regulating United States Business Corporations, in HARMONIZATION OF 
COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACH 31, 32 
(Boudewijn Wachter ed., 1989). 
By and large, the cultural and institutional differences among our several 
States as they joined the Federal union were, though distinct, nowhere 
near as great as those of the nations making up the European Community. 
A common language was shared. The institutions of commerce were 
evolving and were in no sense as mature and developed as the business 
organizations of the present European Community members. 
Id.  
10 See generally Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 [hereinafter 
SE Regulation]; see also Council Directive 2001/86/EC, (18), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22, 23 
[hereinafter SE Directive]. 
11 SE Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 1–7. 
12 See, e.g., Vanessa Edwards, The European Company—Essential Tool or 
Eviscerated Dream?, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 443, 443–50 (2003) (“Given the 
apparently intractable political differences concerning worker involvement which 
had dogged the proposed legislation, it is perhaps remarkable that agreement 
ultimately proved possible.”). 
13 See SE Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 4, 12, 20, 21, 26, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 
47(1), 51, 52(1)(b)–(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2); see also Frits Bolkestein, 
Member of the European Comm’n in Charge of the Internal Mkt. and Taxation, 
Address at the University of Leiden: The New European Company: Opportunity in 
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resulted,14 with a supplementary negotiation process for 
establishing employee representation on company boards.  The 
result has raised concerns that rather than integrating European 
commercial markets,15 the SE will instead introduce regulatory 
competition16 and dilute national social protections.17 
The current efforts of the EU to reconcile multiple national 
regimes into a regional construct have significance for the U.S.  
Not only do they affect global business and therefore concern 
American companies, but an understanding of how regional 
dynamics are evolving in Europe provides a better sense of how 
legal regimes might evolve in the U.S.  Although the two systems 
are unlikely to mimic each other exactly and the final form of 
initiatives in Europe remains far from clear, the spirit of how the 
dynamics in Europe are developing has relevance to the U.S., 
particularly as the U.S. begins to devise new systems for 
regulating activities that cross international boundaries. 
 
Diversity (Nov. 29, 2002) (The “initial idea and the tangible achievement we have 
today, namely ‘the new European Company,’ are worlds apart.”). 
14 There are SEs for each of the twenty-seven EU Member States and for each of 
the three additional Member States of the European Economic Area: Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, and Norway. TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 18.  
15 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 416 (1956) (describing the theory of regulatory competition). According to 
Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin,  
[T]he mechanism through which competition operates is mobility of persons 
and resources across jurisdictional boundaries. In [Tiebout’s] ‘pure theory’ 
of fiscal federalism, local authorities compete to attract residents by 
offering packages of services in return for levying taxes at differential 
rates. Consumers with homogenous wants then ‘cluster’ in particular 
localities. The effect is to match local preferences to particular levels of 
service provision, thereby maximising the satisfaction of wants while 
maintaining diversity and promoting information flows between 
jurisdictions. 
Catherine Barnard & Simon Deakin, Market Access and Regulatory Competition, in 
THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES 199 
(Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002); see also REGULATORY COMPETITION 
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES xxiii (Daniel C. Etsy & 
Damien Geradin eds., 2001). 
16 The first paper dealing with this idea was Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: 
The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, 4 J. 
CORP. L.S. 77, 77 (2004).  
17 Another line of scholarship has suggested that companies choose the SE over 
other national corporate forms, in order to mitigate the requirements of mandatory 
codetermination. See generally Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf, 
Die Societas Europaea: Empirische Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungslinien einer 
neuen Rechtsform, 53 AG 721 (2008). 
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A comprehensive, empirical analysis of the reasons that 
companies incorporate as SEs has not been conducted until now.  
While so far the number of companies that have changed their 
status from national to pan-European has been relatively 
modest,18 the group includes leading corporations in sensitive 
sectors, such as financial services and insurance.   
This comparative study of the SE is intended to decipher the 
mechanisms and processes by which the legislation has triggered 
the development of a more integrated European market, on the 
one hand, and guarded against an increase in regulatory 
arbitrage (both inter- and intra-state), on the other.  It is based 
on extensive in-person interviews with corporate decisionmakers, 
union leaders, legal advisors, and policymakers in several 
Member States and at EU headquarters.  
The Article begins with an exploration of the approach the 
SE takes to integration and its roots in EU politics.  After 
describing the methodology, it then presents a series of case 
studies derived from the interviews, highlighting information 
gathered in conversations with representatives from companies 
that have converted to the SE as well as from those that have 
not. 
The data from the interviews suggest that although the EU 
could not prescribe regional-level rules from the outset, the 
preferences of companies considering the new form are now 
stimulating increased convergence of corporate law in Europe.19  
Companies that convert to the SE in order to streamline their 
multinational operations and reduce their compliance obligations 
promote the harmonization of additional areas of law and the 
development of more regionalized regulation.  Several features of 
the SE legislation restrict companies from using the form for 
inter-state arbitrage.20  Consequently, it has introduced only 
 
18 See Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, ETUI, http://ecdb.worker-
participation.eu/show_overview.php?letter=A&orderField=se_name&status_id=3&ti
tle=Established%20SEs (describing a continually updated list of established SE 
companies) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
19 See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, 
17 EUR. L. J. 224 (2009); Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: 
Which Model for Europe? (Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 323 (2006)) [hereinafter Legal Diversity]. 
20 In theoretical studies, Luca Enriques and others predicted that SE would 
cause regulatory competition in Europe. Enriques, supra note 16, at 79; Marios 
Bouloukos, The European Company (SE) as a Vehicle for Corporate Mobility Within 
the EU: A Breakthrough in European Corporate Law, 18 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 535, 549–
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minimal regulatory competition to Europe.  Member States that 
undertake to attract reincorporating companies, however, have 
offered them progressively similar terms, decreasing legal 
diversity.  While the SE has not appeared to threaten employee 
representation on company boards, mandated in several Member 
States including Germany,21 it has contributed to a reduction and 
diversification in the number and nationality of the employee 
representatives serving on them, bringing the Member States 
into closer alignment on the issue and fueling more regionalized 
labor organization.  It will become increasingly important to 
evaluate the need for safeguards for other constituencies, who do 
not have power over corporate decisions. 
The tensions between state and federal, national and 
regional, play out with specificity in the corporate law arena, 
instead of remaining a pure policy debate.  Companies must 
continue to operate, experiencing their own economic cycles as 
the political context changes.  If companies demonstrate that 
increased federalization is beneficial for profit generation and for 
other stakeholders, they offer support for the idea of the 
European Union and the goal of regionalization more generally.  
While regional consolidation reduces transaction costs for 
companies, it may come at the expense of social welfare more 
broadly.22  The development of innovative approaches for 
 
50 (2007); Clark D. Stith, Note, Federalism and Company Law: A ‘Race to the 
Bottom’ in the European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1611–12 (1991). Other 
commentators who have analyzed the possibilities, however, have hypothesized that 
the SE is not a sufficiently attractive tool. Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. 
Vermeulen, Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?, 11 EUR. L.J. 
785, 792 (2005); W. Bratton, J. McCahery & E. Vermeulen, How Does Corporate 
Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis (European Corporate 
Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 91, 2008), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086667. 
21 Horst Eidenmüller and others have noted that the SE creates opportunities 
for arbitrage within individual Member States, as regards their board structures, in 
addition to the potential for arbitrage among Member States. Eidenmüller, Engert, 
and Hornuf posed fourteen questions to SE companies in Germany during twenty-
minute telephone surveys and found strong evidence that firms use the SE to 
mitigate the effects of mandatory codetermination. Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas 
Engert & Lars Hornuf, Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea 
as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009); see also 
Paul L. Davies, Workers on the Board of the European Company?, 32 INDUSTRIAL L. 
J. 75, 75 (2003). 
22 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635 
(2004) (describing the federal government’s potential to be a “good influence—
because it’s the custodian of the American economy”—or a “pernicious influence—
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organizing areas split between regional and local spheres and 
divided by borders appears to present a key challenge for modern 
governance in all parts of the world.  “Old America” and the “new 
Europe”23 may have much on which they can work together.  
II. METHODOLOGY 
This Article is based on data I gathered in seventy-five 
interviews, with general counsels, chief financial officers, and 
other legal advisors at one half of the active SEs.24  The 
companies I included have headquarters in Austria, Belgium, 
China, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, and 
comprise the biotechnology, chemical, electronic, financial 
service, insurance, medical equipment, metal, oil, paper, real 
estate, and reinsurance industries.25 
For context, I also interviewed legal academics, 
representatives to the European Commission, company lawyers, 
labor advocates, journalists, and policy analysts at European 
think tanks and nongovernmental organizations.  Directors and 
officers of companies that considered SE conversions but decided 
against them in Bermuda, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland offered additional 
viewpoints. 
The resulting case study evidence of how European 
companies perceive the SE sheds light on their decisionmaking 
and the mechanisms through which EU legislation can advance a 
single commercial Europe or introduce cross-border or within-
country arbitrage.  Alternative methods to conducting fieldwork 
in multiple jurisdictions would not achieve this.  Quantitative 
 
because it’s susceptible to error and interest group influence” and, due to its over-
arching position, can impose inefficient corporate rules). 
23 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Francis 
Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed. 1863) (1835). 
24 The figure is as of August, 2008, when the Article entered the editing process. 
By that date, 112 total SEs had been established, with 36 actually conducting 
operations. The remainder exist legally but do not conduct business or employ any 
workers. 
25 The interviews were not intended as a random sample but as a means for 
collecting firsthand accounts with which to understand the dynamics driving 
corporate decisionmaking. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND 
METHODS 12 (4th ed. 2009); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case 
Study Research, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 532, 534 (1989). 
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studies are hindered by the wide variation in: (1) the number of 
SE companies in different Member States; (2) the number of 
companies in each Member State eligible to transform to the SE; 
and (3) the number of companies in each Member Sate that 
operate transnationally and would benefit from conversion to the 
SE.  The existence of nonoperational SEs also complicates 
meaningful quantitative analysis, and the SE’s recent 
implementation precludes gathering time series evidence in 
order to demonstrate causation.  Furthermore, because all of the 
Member States have transcribed the SE legislation, no control 
variable exists.  The in-depth interviews also reveal disparities 
between companies’ intentions in converting and the legal 
obstacles they have encountered in following through:  While 
companies may report an interest in moving or recalibrating 
their boards, investigating the legal mechanisms required can 
expose sufficient unexpected costs and obstacles to dissuade 
them.   
III. HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Before exploring how companies in Europe are using the SE, 
it is first necessary to understand the history and context of the 
development of the legislation.  The institutional structure of the 
EU, the general legal environment in which European companies 
operate, and the compromises necessary to attain consensus on 
the SE legislation demonstrate parallel trends towards more free 
competition among the Member States.  A liberalizing evolution 
can be documented in each area.   
A. Institutional Background 
While the U.S. and the EU both represent sovereign entities 
that have delegated specific responsibilities to a central 
authority,26 the EU differs greatly from the U.S. in the 
circumstances surrounding its inception and the form into which 
 
26 See Landau, supra note 9, at 31.  
Superficially at least there are some obvious similarities. The United 
States began with a number of separate, highly autonomous and proudly 
parochial colonies and then States, which united together for the common 
good with great misgivings and strong desires to preserve prerogatives, 
distinctions and independence. Their union was one driven by mutual 
economic, commercial and military needs. 
Id. 
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it has evolved.27  The EU developed for economic reasons.  Its 
most significant achievements have occurred in the field of 
business law,28 and its supranational structure chiefly reflects 
the completion of a series of incremental steps towards the 
creation of a single commercial market.29 
The EU was formed in the wake of the Second World War, 
and at the early stages of the developing Cold War between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union.30  Its establishment was primarily 
intended to advance the economic goal of rebuilding and 
reintegrating the German economy while addressing fresh 
memories of German initiatives in two major world conflicts.31  In 
1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg signed a treaty creating the European Coal and 
Steel Community, which placed the industries under a 
supranational authority and created a common market for 
 
27 See Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will 
Germany Be the “Virginia of Europe?,” 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 208 (1995) (stating 
that the U.S. Constitution opens with the line “We the people,” while the Treaty of 
Maastricht “opens with ‘His Majesty the King of the Belgians; Her Majesty the 
Queen of Denmark; The President of the Federal Republic of Germany . . . ,’ leaving 
no room for doubt that the parties to the Treaty of Maastricht are the sovereign 
states of Europe, not the ‘people of Europe’ ” (internal citation omitted)). 
28 See, e.g., First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 (EC) (addressing information 
disclosure, contracts, dissolution); Second Council Directive 77/91, 1976 (EC) 
(addressing capitalization of public companies); Third Council Directive 78/855, 1978 
(EC) (addressing mergers of public limited liability companies); Sixth Council 
Directive 82/891, 1982 (EC) (addressing divisions of public limited liability 
companies); Fourth Council Directive 78/660, 1978 (EC), Seventh Council Directive 
83/349, 1983 (EC), and Eighth Council Directive 79/1072, 1979 (EC) (addressing 
accounts and auditing); Eleventh Council Directive 89/666, 1989 (EC) (addressing 
company branches and disclosure); Twelfth Council Directive 89/667, 1989 (EC) 
(addressing private limited liability companies). 
29 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 744–45 (1999) (discussing 
“[t]he impulse to reduce diversity among the legal systems governing commerce”). 
30 See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First 
Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 515 (2001) (discussing the consequences of this 
particular history). 
31 See, e.g., VICTORIA CURZON, THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
LESSONS OF EFTA EXPERIENCE 28–29 (1974). 
The end of World War II was a time of heroic plans for institutionalizing 
inter-state relations so as to bring order into international affairs and thus 
blot out the danger of another war. Nowhere were these feelings expressed 
more strongly than in Western Europe, where a federation of European 
states was considered by many to be the only sound basis upon which to 
build a lasting peace. 
Id. 
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them.32  At roughly the same time, France proposed a European 
Defense Community with a single European army, in order to 
rearm Germany while also constraining its military development 
within a European context.33  The proposal was rejected in 1954, 
however, and future European developments continued along the 
more narrow path of economic integration.34 
Each European country therefore retains far greater power 
to govern than the fifty U.S. states.35  The EU, for example, holds 
no responsibility for the provision of social welfare, has no police, 
and sets no education policy.36  Because it was founded at a date 
late in the development of the individual Member States, each 
has its own attitudes towards integration and correspondingly 
unique legislative goals.37  In the corporate law area specifically, 
 
32 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 99, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. 
33 CURZON, supra note 31, at 30.  
France responded to the strategic problems posed by West Germany in a 
strikingly original manner. On the one hand, she proposed the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a plan to put German heavy industry 
under joint European control; on the other, she proposed a European army 
into which the rearmed German troops could be integrated. In this fashion 
the economic and military recovery of Germany would be placed under 
European, not to say specifically French, control. In the end, the European 
Defence Community, which implied a unified European command . . . was 
rejected by the French National Assembly, while the ECSC was 
implemented. 
Id. 
34 Id.  
With the failure of the European Defence Community, and its corollary, the 
European Political Community, Monnet and his supporters turned to 
economic integration as a third-best vehicle upon which to carry Western 
Europe along the road to political union. The six foreign ministers of the 
ECSC members met at Messina in June 1955 and agreed to study a 
Benelux proposal to create a European common market covering all 
products. 
Id. 
35 See Stephen Weatherill, Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of 
Competence To Regulate the Internal Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN 
MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES, supra note 15, at 41, 42 (noting that we “must 
interrogate the dilemma of emerging transnational governance in Europe which 
assumes the economic viability of constructing a single market against a political 
background of multiple sources of legislative authority”). 
36 See Andrew Moravcsik, Federalism in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE 
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 165, 165–68 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 
2001). 
37 See, e.g., Ulrich Haltern, Integration Through Law, in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION THEORY 177, 189 (Thomas Diez & Antje Wiener eds., 2004) (“Citizens 
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each country’s national system of legal rules and distinct cultural 
norms has posed challenges to the development of the single 
market.38 
Most corporate EU legislation has been based on specific 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.39  Signed by France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1957, the 
Treaty launched the creation of the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”)40 and explicitly enunciated a commitment to 
the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital among 
the Member States, and the development of common policies for 
external trade, competition, and agriculture.41  It empowered the 
Council of Ministers to adopt new Community legislation to “co-
ordinat[e] to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required 
by Member States of companies or firms . . . with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent throughout the 
Community.”42  Article 235 authorized the Community to “take 
the appropriate measures” if “action by the Community should 
 
do not identify with the Union; rather, they feel alienated . . . . The reason may be 
that the nation, through its myths, provides a social home, a shared history, and a 
common destination.”); see also Hans Lindahl, European Integration: Popular 
Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries, 6 EUR. L.J. 239, 243–44 (2000). 
38 See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate 
Governance, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 36 (1998); Jette Steen Knudsen, Is the Single 
European Market an Illusion? Obstacles to Reform of EU Takeover Regulation, 11 
EUR. L.J. 507, 524 (2005); Antoine Rebérioux, European Style of Corporate 
Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement, 40 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 111, 126–27 (2002); Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and National 
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
867, 869 (2004); see also Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: 
What Role for the EC, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW IN ACCELERATED PROGRESS 
(S.M. Bartman ed., 2006). 
39 See, e.g., ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 40 (2d ed. 
2009). 
40 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Preamble, Rome, 
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. 
41 See id. arts. 137, 145, 155, 164. 
The Rome Treaty laid the foundations for economic integration. This was 
the principal focus of the Treaty, and it was a conscious decision after the 
failures of the more ambitious attempts at European integration of the 
mid-1950s. The particular form of economic integration chosen was a 
common market. It was therefore more ambitious than other, lesser modes 
of integration. 
Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
42 Treaty of Rome, supra note 40, art. 54(3)(g). 
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prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the 
common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.”43  
European businesses have consistently supported European 
integration.44  Faced with the need to operate across multiple  
national systems with different and sometimes conflicting rules, 
they showed interest in a European-level company, independent 
of the laws of the individual Member States, even before the 
formation of the European Community.  The first proposal to 
create the SE was made as early as 1910.45  A preliminary draft 
of the SE statute, in 1966, utilized article 235 of the Treaty of 
Rome as its foundation.46 
During the prolonged negotiation process over the SE, and in 
spite of increasing political ill will towards European initiatives,47 
companies’ belief in the utility of a European corporate form 
persisted.  In a 1985 white paper, Completing the Internal 
Market, the European Commission urged the adoption of the SE, 
terming it “essential” for enabling companies to coordinate their 
 
43 Id. art. 235. 
44 See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 29.  
45 ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: NATIONAL 
REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION 439 (1971). 
46 See Pieter Sanders, Projet d’un Statut des Societes Anonymes Europeennes 
(Etude Serie Concurrence No. 6, 1967) [hereinafter 1966 Preliminary Draft Statute]. 
47 The Maastricht Treaty was first rejected in a Danish referendum and then 
approved by French voters by a margin of just one percent. See RICHARD CORBETT, 
THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION 65–67 (1993). In 
addition to launching the transition to the Euro and creating the European Central 
Bank, see Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), 31 I.L.M. 253 
(1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty], it included a provision on a principle called 
subsidiarity, whereby the Union may not take action unless it can be more effective 
than national actors, a policy that has its roots in Catholic social teaching. Id. art. 
3b. See generally Denis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism’s Failure: Subsidiarity in 
the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537 (1996); Christoph Henkel, The 
Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Close Look at the Principle of 
Subsidiary, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 359 (2002); A.G Toth, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992). Older 
Member States resented the cost of helping poorer, Eastern European countries to 
join the enlarging Union. John D. Donahue & Mark A. Pollack, Centralization and 
Its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism in the United States and the European 
Union, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 36, at 73, 112. Others who 
had cut their budgets to qualify for the Euro resented participating in regional-level 
projects. Id. Germany in particular, faced with paying for the reunification of the 
former East Germany, became less eager to contribute financially to Europe. Id. 
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operations on a cross-border basis.48  In 1988, a commission 
memorandum decried the inability of companies in Europe to 
merge across national borders, the existence of inconsistent 
national tax laws that skewed corporate decisionmaking, and the 
lack of mutual recognition of companies among the European 
Member States.49  The memorandum deemed cross-border 
business activity imperative for successful competition against 
the U.S. and Japan.50 
B. Legal Environment 
The vision for the European single market has changed over 
time.  The idea of a closed, legally uniform arrangement with no 
competition among the Member States was eventually overtaken 
by a line of decisions by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
that has allowed companies more freedom to choose the national 
legal system under which they will operate.  The new judicial 
openness towards competition among the Member States has 
since been reflected in European legislation, including the SE. 
Throughout the 1960s, the EEC promulgated a series of 
corporate law directives chiefly designed to prevent competition 
among the Member States.51  France sought to prevent its 
companies from reincoroporating in other countries with more 
permissive legal regimes.  Germany joined with it in promoting a 
program of top-down harmonization of corporate law to prevent 
such a “race to the bottom.”52  The first generation of European 
directives therefore largely restated the laws that the Member 
States already held in common, such as minimum capital 
requirements and rules mandating corporate disclosures.53 
 
48 Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, at 4, 26–27, 
COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).  
49 Internal Market and Cooperation, Statute for the European Company, 
Commission Memorandum, at 5, COM (88) 320 final (June 8, 1988) [hereinafter 
1988 Memorandum]. 
50 Id. 
51 See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 20; David Charny, Competition 
Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective 
on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 
424 (1991).  
52 See CHRISTIAN W.A. TIMMERMANS, FIRST WALTER VAN GERVEN LECTURE: 
COMPANY LAW AS IUS COMMUNE? 5 (Wouter Devroe & Dimitri Droshout eds., 2002). 
53 First Council Directive 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (I) (disclosure of corporate data); 
Second Council Directive 77/91, art. 6, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 31, 1 (EC) (establishing 
capital minimums). 
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Almost no competition to attract corporate charters 
developed in Europe.54  Most Member States have observed the 
real seat principle, which states that the laws of the country 
where a company bases its operations govern all of its activities.55  
The principle has prevented companies from incorporating in 
countries with more lenient legal regimes if their businesses are 
focused elsewhere.56 
A series of judgments of the European Court of Justice, 
beginning in 1999 with Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og 
Seskabsstyrelsen,57 transformed the context within which the 
integration of European corporate law was occurring.  The 
Centros line of cases seemed to introduce the potential for U.S.-
style regulatory competition among the EU Member States,58 
although the ECJ’s 2009 decision in Cartesio Oktató és 
Szolgáltató BT59 may indicate that the development has now run 
out. 
 
 
 
54 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (stating that while U.S. law 
converged on Delaware, the real seat principle kept Europe from regulatory 
competition and hence from convergence of its company laws). 
55 See, e.g., Wymeersch, supra note 8, at 668 (“The ‘siege reel’ criterion was 
introduced in France after discussion about French companies emigrating to the 
legally more clement climate in Belgium in the 19th century.”). 
56 See, e.g., Inne G. F. Cath, Freedom of Establishment of Companies: A New 
Step Towards Completion of the Internal Market, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 
247, 247 (Francis G. Jacobs ed., 1988); Robert R. Drury, The Regulation and 
Recognition of Foreign Corporations: Responses to the ‘Delaware Syndrome’, 57 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 166, 187 (1998). 
57 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-
01459. 
58 See Gilson, supra note 54, at 351 (stating that Centros destabilized the 
equilibrium of diverse corporate regimes). See generally Kilian Baelz & Teresa 
Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The European Court of 
Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and Its Impact on German and 
European Company Law, 3 GERMAN L.J. 12 (2002); Sebastian Mock, Harmonization, 
Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law, 3 GERMAN L.J. 
12 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 821  
(2001); Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of 
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
177 (2003). 
59 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641 (denying 
a Hungarian company the right to remain subject to Hungarian law after moving its 
central headquarters to Italy). 
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In Centros, two Danish citizens incorporated a company in 
the UK in order to avoid Denmark’s rigorous minimum 
capitalization requirements.60  They intended to establish a 
branch of the company in Denmark, which would carry out its 
principal business.61  The Danish commercial registry, in an 
attempt to uphold the spirit of the national laws, refused to 
register the branch.62  The ECJ reversed the decision on free 
establishment grounds,63 and many legal commentators assumed 
that the ECJ had indicated that the real seat principle violated 
the right to free establishment64 set out in the Treaty of Rome.65 
Überseering and Inspire Art, two later cases, seemed to 
confirm a view of the ECJ that companies may incorporate in any 
Member State they choose.66  In Überseering, the ECJ held that it 
was incompatible with the freedom of establishment for a 
Member State to deny judicial standing to a company that had 
moved its administrative headquarters.67  Überseering had been 
formed according to Dutch law, but its shareholders and 
principal office were located in Germany.68  A German court ruled 
that German corporate law, not Dutch, applied to the company 
because of the location of its headquarters and that the Dutch 
corporate entity had no standing in German court.69  The ECJ 
overturned the decision of the German court, holding that a 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 
E.C.R. I-01459. 
64 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community arts. 43, 48, Rome, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. 
(C 321) 31, 34 [hereinafter TEU].  
65 Note that in Cartesio, the ECJ firmly rejected such speculation, affirming the 
validity of the real seat theory by denying a Hungarian company the right to remain 
subject to Hungarian law after moving its central headquarters to Italy. Case C-
210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 119, 124. Under 
Cartesio, if a company moves its real seat, the Member State where it was originally 
incorporated may choose not to continue to recognize it as a company of its own 
nationality. Id. 
66 See, e.g., Thomas Bachner, Freedom of Establishment for Companies: A Great 
Leap Forward, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 47, 48–49 (2003); Baelz & Baldwin, supra note 
58; Frank Wooldridge, Überseering: Freedom of Establishment of Companies 
Affirmed, 14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 227, 227 (2003) (discussing Überseering). 
67 C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 94. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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foreign-incorporated company must be recognized, regardless of 
the location of its administrative seat.70  In Inspire Art, the ECJ 
disallowed rules mandating the application of the laws of the 
host state to companies registered in other Member States.71  A 
Dutch company incorporated in the UK had registered a branch 
office in the Netherlands, and the Netherlands had applied 
Dutch corporate law in accordance with its rules for foreign 
companies.72 
The SE legislation reflects the transformation in the 
equilibrium that had existed in Europe, in which companies did 
not move between Member States and generally incorporated 
where they conducted their primary operations.  The legislation 
has explicitly allowed companies to reincorporate, subject to the 
requirement that they also move their headquarters,73 and its 
references to national law have introduced a novel potential for 
Member States to begin competing for corporate charters.74   
Subsequent EU legislation has followed the approach of the 
SE in creating a European framework with references to national 
law, rather than directly harmonizing the substantive law of the 
Member States.  The Takeover Directive,75 for example, allows 
Member States discretion over the legality of defensive measures 
against hostile bids.76  The European Commission adopted 
“recommendations” rather than binding directives on directors’ 
remuneration and the role of nonexecutive and supervisory 
directors.77  In September 2001, the Commission established a 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (“High Level Group”) 
to reform the regulatory framework in which EU corporate law 
 
70 Id. 
71 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. 
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155. 
72 See id. 
73 SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 7. 
74 See id. arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 41(1) para. 1, 51, 52(1)(b), 52(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57, 
59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2). 
75 See Council Directive 2004/25/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12–13. 
76 Id. at 12 (concerning takeover bids). 
77 Press Release, European Comm’n, Corporate Governance: Commission Urges 
Member States To Ensure a Strong Role for Independent Directors (Oct. 6, 2004), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1182& 
format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, European 
Comm’n, Directors’ Pay—Commission Sets out Guidance on Disclosure and 
Shareholder Control (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/04/1183&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en. 
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operates.  The High Level Group expressly disavowed the 
substantive harmonization of corporate law through directives, 
stating that their lack of flexibility “petrifies” corporate 
structures.78 
C. Framework Form 
As Europe turned from the complete harmonization of its 
corporate law towards permitting more open competition among 
the Member States, the SE itself evolved in a similar way.  
Successive drafts of the SE legislation over the course of the 
forty-year negotiation period79 reflect increasing deference to the 
prerogatives of the Member States, especially in the areas of 
taxation and social rights. 
The European Commission’s first proposal for the SE, 
drafted in 1970, included more than four hundred articles, which 
detailed provisions for the corporation’s formation, capital 
structure, and management structure; the rights of shareholders; 
accounting; liquidation; and insolvency.80  The comprehensive 
rules freed European companies from citizenship in any 
particular country;81 the legislation stated expressly that 
national development of business could “fragment markets,” 
reducing the economic competitiveness of Europe.82   
The final legislation, by contrast, contains only seventy 
articles.83  The framework it provides refers to national law sixty-
five distinct times.84 
A significant source of disagreement among the Member 
States concerned whether the SE legislation should include a 
European system of taxation, with losses in one Member State 
 
78 REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF EXPERTS, A MODERN REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 31 (2002). 
79 See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC). 
80 See Pieter Sanders, The European Company, 6 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 
367 (1976); see also Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for 
European Companies, at 11, COM (75) 150 final (Mar. 10, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 
Draft Statute]. 
81 See generally GROUP OF EXPERTS, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF WORKER 
INVOLVEMENT (1997). 
82 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Embodying a Statute for the 
European Company, at 5, COM (70) 600 final (June 30, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 
Draft Statute]. 
83 See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1–18 (EC). 
84 SE Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53, 
54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2). 
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offset against gains in another or whether each country could 
maintain its own, separate scheme.85  The Commission’s first 
proposal for the SE, in 1970, provided for the uniform taxation of 
SE companies.86  Its next proposal, in 1989,87 deemphasized 
taxation88 but afforded companies new freedoms to offset losses 
among Member States.89  The final SE legislation90 does not 
include any provisions on taxation.91 
The European Commission also struggled to craft guidelines 
for employee representation92 on company boards sufficiently 
liberal to satisfy the Member States that have not mandated it, 
without antagonizing the Member States committed to its 
continuation.93  Several Member States require specific levels of 
employee representation for different types of companies of 
different sizes, while others have no equivalent systems.94  The 
Commission’s first proposed legislation mimicked the most 
rigorous national requirements for representation: a mandatory 
two-tier board with employees filling at least one-third of the 
supervisory board seats.95  The Commission’s next proposal, in 
1989,96 divided the legislation into a regulation and a directive, 
and relegated provisions for employee representation to the 
 
85 Compare Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, at 
67, COM (89) 268 final (Aug. 25, 1989), with Amended Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, at 31, COM (91) 174 final (May 
6, 1991) (stating that for the purpose of taxation, the SE must be made subject to the 
laws of the State in which it resides). 
86 See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82. 
87 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, COM (89) 268 final (Oct. 16, 1989); 1991 O.J. (C 138) 8, 
COM (1991) 174 final (May 29, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Regulation]. 
88 Compare 1988 Commission Memorandum, supra note 49, at 8–10, 21, with 
1991 Proposed Regulation, supra note 87, art. 133, at 67–68. 
89 See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82, arts. 278–81, at 220–23; 1975 Draft 
Statute, supra note 80, arts. 278–81, at 119–21. 
90 See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC). 
91 SE Regulation, supra note 10, recital 20. 
92 See, e.g., Claire Leca, The Participation of Employees’ Representatives in the 
Governance Structure of the Societas Europeae, 18 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 403, 403–04 
(2007). 
93 Employee involvement has posed a similar obstacle to the adoption of the 
Fifth Directive and the Cross-Border Merger Directive. See, e.g., Geoffrey Fitchew, 
Political Choices, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON 
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 1, 12 (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991). 
94 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE 30 (European Comm’n ed., 2000). 
95 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82, arts. 62, 73, 137. 
96 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41; COM (89) 268 final. The Commission amended this draft 
in 1991. See 1991 O.J. (C 176) 1, COM (91) 174.   
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directive.97  After it failed to draw sufficient support, the 
Commission established the High Level Group, chaired by former 
Commission President Etienne Davignon.  The High Level Group 
devised a solution to the deadlock on employee representation by 
judging the Member States’ attitudes towards representation too 
diverse for harmonization and outlining a negotiation process, in 
place of a static set of compromise rules.98  The final directive 
sets out a compulsory negotiation period between management 
and employees, with a principle known as “before and after” 
taking effect when negotiations fail.99  According to the principle, 
management must guarantee that the same level of 
representation, if any, will continue after conversion to the SE.100  
The directive seemed to assure the Member States that 
companies with representation would not be able to use the SE to 
evade it and that companies without representation would not 
have to offer it to their employees if they converted to the SE.101  
In fact, however, because the legislation does not preempt 
national law,102 companies have converted to the SE in order to 
substitute its rules for national requirements for employee 
representation.103 
 
 
97 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 
1989 O.J. (C 263) 41; Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for 
a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees, BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, May 1989, at 1 [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Directive]. The provisions 
offered Member States three separate models of participation from which they could 
choose: representation on corporate boards parallel to the German model of workers’ 
rights, representation on a separate works council according to the French system, 
or a negotiated arrangement for representation as suggested by Swedish practices. 
It also offered SE companies the ability to select between a one and two-tier board.  
1991 Proposed Directive, supra, art. 61, at 31. 
98 1991 O.J. (C 176) 1, COM (91) 174. 
99 SE Directive, supra note 10, at 22, 23. 
100 Id. 
101 See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards:  
Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Intergration in 
Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 203 (1994). 
102 See, e.g., Jaap Winter, Thalassa! Thalassa!—The SE as a Glimpse of the 
Future?, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 113, 122 (Jonathan Rickford ed., 2003); 
TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11. 
103 See, e.g., Leca, supra note 92, at 417; Cristoph Teichmann, Restructuring 
Companies in Europe: A German Perspective, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1325, 1334 
(2004). 
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A compromise on the SE was finally reached in December 
2000.104  Following negotiations with the European Parliament, 
the SE came into force on October 8, 2004.105  As of January 2008, 
129 SE corporations have been established, although many of 
them do not yet conduct operations or employ any workers.106 
IV. HOW ARE COMPANIES USING THE SE? 
Legal commentators, beginning with Luca Enriques, 
predicted that the SE legislation’s references to national law107 
would combine with the SE’s ability to move108 to create 
possibilities for Member States to compete for incorporations.109  
They forecast a new European corporate charter market.110  
Horst Eidenmüller and others noted that the SE Directive also 
offers opportunities for arbitrage within Member States over 
employee representation.  Companies may choose between the 
rules of the new form and national requirements for board 
structures.111   
My interview data, however, suggest that the SE primarily 
facilitates within-group restructuring by allowing for legal cross-
border mergers.  Companies have used SE conversions to absorb 
their subsidiaries and establish branches, without the legal 
contortions that had previously been necessary.  Branched 
structures have enabled companies to gain integrated 
supervision in specific industries.   
 
104 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, para. 21 (Oct. 16, 2008). 
105 Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC), art. 70. The SE 
Regulation applies directly to the Member States, but the SE Directive needed to be 
transposed into national law. By October 8, 2004, only Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, Iceland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
had done so. See Directive 2001//86/EC–State of Implementation 1st September 
2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2946&langId=en. 
106 See infra Part III.B.3. 
107 Council Regulation No. 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1–18 (EC), arts. 4(3), 13, 
15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2). 
108 Id. art. 8; see also TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11. 
109 Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a 
Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage (Working Paper No. 07/2003, 2004). But see 
McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 20; Bratton, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra 
note 20.  
110 See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 549; Stith, supra note 20. 
111 SEs may opt for a one-tier or two-tier board and negotiate employee 
participation, Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 4 (EC), with a 
fall-back position defined by the “before and after principle.” Id. art. 38(b); see also 
Davies, supra note 21, at 80–81; Eidenmüller, Engert & Hornuf, supra note 21, at 2. 
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This Article analyzes case studies of how companies are 
making use of the SE and argues that the patterns of use will 
ultimately lead to a deeper regionalization of law and regulation 
in Europe.  Companies in industries in which a parent company 
and its branches are not regulated together have demanded new 
regional regulatory structures and the harmonization of 
additional areas of law.  While many companies report that the 
cost of reincorporating and making changes to corporate boards 
outweighs the benefits to be gained, those that have used the SE 
to move have reduced distinctions in the laws of the Member 
States.  The few companies that have converted to the SE to 
adjust the number and nationality of employee representatives 
on their boards have established new boards more similar to 
those in countries without employee representation.  This Section 
explores the mechanisms for legal convergence that use of the SE 
provides, and it describes the aspects of the legislation that 
constrain companies from employing the form for regulatory 
competition and internal arbitrage.112 
A. Completing the Single Market? 
Companies in specific industries have used the SE to correct 
a misalignment that has developed between national regulatory 
oversight and international business activities.  Most 
multinational companies in Europe have continued to report to 
multiple national supervisors, even as the strategies they pursue 
and the risks they assume take place on an increasingly regional 
or global level.  Because the SE allows for legal cross-border 
mergers, it facilitates regional restructuring by enabling 
companies to replace their subsidiaries with branches.  Leading 
companies in the insurance and reinsurance industries have  
 
 
 
 
112 See, e.g., Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll, The Societas Europaea—A Step 
Towards Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems? (2005) (discussing trends 
towards global convergence), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704881; Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33, 50–55 (Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). But see Douglas M. Branson, The Very 
Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 321, 329 (2001). 
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converted to the SE and adopted a branched structure, in order 
to achieve integrated regulation at the level of the parent 
company.113   
As a result, the form appears to be progressing114:  In the 
four years since its introduction,115 the number of companies to 
convert has risen sharply.116  Companies in sectors where unified 
regulation is unachievable, however, have been less likely to 
adopt the SE.  The complete legal environment with which 
companies interact constrains what they can use the form to 
accomplish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 See, e.g., Weatherill, supra note 35, at 41. 
[T]he dominant legislative preference is for a system of ‘home State 
control’, according to which harmonised rules of proper regulatory conduct 
are agreed at Community level but enforced at national level and pursuant 
to which it is assumed that ‘home States’ will subject firms based on their 
territory to the agreed Community rules while ‘host States’, in which target 
consumers of the firm are based, are excluded from actively applying not 
only domestic rules, but even in some circumstances the agreed Community 
rules. The host State’s competence is pre-empted; the home State is 
expected to perform the job of supervision. 
Id. 
114 According to one company lawyer, eighty-five percent of his time over the last 
eight months has been spent on SE projects. Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
28, location not identified (Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with author).  
115 It should be noted that many countries did not meet the October 8, 2004 
deadline for implementing legislation. See ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON THE 
OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY (SE), 
FINAL REPORT (2009) 55, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
consultations/docs/2010/se/study_SE_9122009_en.pdf.  
116 See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Timeline117 
The SE is therefore a nascent but revealing factor that 
challenges the Member States to cede national authority over 
corporate law and regulation.  While originally they could not 
agree on a complete system of corporate law, the diverse national 
systems of the Member States will begin to converge as 
companies interested in converting to the SE encounter its 
limitations and demand more legal harmonization and regional 
regulation.  
Questions persist, however, over the normative benefits of 
convergence, particularly for noncorporate stakeholders.  The 
desirability of bank branching has become central to the debate 
over how to protect citizens from the consequences of financial 
crises.  Small countries, such as Iceland118 and Austria,119 may 
have difficulty rescuing large, vertically integrated companies 
that operate transnationally.120  In the banking sector 
 
117 EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE OF SE 
FOUNDING IN EUROPE 3 (2010). 
118 Assets in Iceland’s banking sector were eight times its GDP, half of which 
were non-local. Pelt Tightening: A Country Staggers Back to its Feet, ECONOMIST, 
July 23, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14098340.  
119 Austria had loaned more than forty-three percent of its GDP to European 
customers. Who’s Next?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/12465279?story_id=12465279.  
120 See Jean Dermine & Dirk Schoenmaker, In Banking, Is Small Beautiful?, 19 
FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS & MKTS. 1, 9 (2010). See generally William H. Buiter & 
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specifically, political obstacles inhibit the use of taxpayer money 
to bail out depositors from other countries.  Yet streamlining the 
regulation of cross-border business activities through branching 
could assist executives and directors of large companies in their 
monitoring and compliance duties by reducing the number of 
regulatory interfaces and also their complexity.  Gathering 
information in a single supervisor could also provide a truer, 
more comprehensive picture of the activities of multinational 
companies and contribute to more accurate predictions of 
systemic problems. 
1. Within-Group Restructuring 
Companies have adopted the SE to reduce their expenses.  
Prior to the implementation of the Directive on Cross-Border 
Mergers,121 the SE provided the only means for companies to 
complete legal, international mergers.122  The SE legislation has 
therefore liberated them from the costly legal contortions that 
had previously been necessary.123  It has also enabled them to 
absorb their subsidiaries and establish branches.  Companies 
that have used the SE to adopt a branched structure for 
integrated supervision have reported savings of more than €350 
million.124  The SE has enabled them to reduce share price 
premiums, the cost of complying with reporting requirements, 
and the amount of regulatory capital they must reserve.  The SE 
has also created a mechanism for companies to move between 
Member States, which has allowed them to consolidate their 
operations without losing other privileges.  In describing its 
motivation for creating the SE, the European Commission stated, 
 
Anne Silbert, The Icelandic Banking Crisis and What To Do About It: The Lender of 
Last Resort Theory of Optimal Currency Areas, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY 
RESEARCH, POLICY INSIGHT, Oct. 2008, available at http://www.cepr.org/ 
pubs/policyinsights/PolicyInsight26.pdf.  
121 See Council Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1. Compare Council 
Directive 2005/56/EC (which took 20 years to complete), with Commission Proposal 
for a Tenth Directive of the Council Based on Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty 
Concerning Cross-Border Mergers of Public Limited Companies, 1985 O.J. (C 23) 1, 
COM (1984) 727 final (Jan. 8, 1985) (one year between first draft and final draft). 
122 See TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 21 (“With the sole exception of 
Italian law, most national laws render cross-border mergers almost impracticable.”). 
123 See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 539 n.11 (explaining the complicated 
methods companies used instead). 
124 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not identified (Feb. 21, 
2008) (on file with author). 
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“it is essential that companies the business of which is not 
limited to satisfying purely local needs should be able to plan and 
carry out the reorganisation of their business on a Community 
scale.”125   
a.  Cross-Border Mergers 
Companies have converted to the SE in order to gain 
ownership of their subsidiaries using mergers rather than 
takeovers, at lower cost and risk. 
Case 1: Allianz (Germany) 
Allianz, the blue chip German insurance and asset 
management company operating in twenty-nine European 
countries, became an SE in order to merge with its 55.4%-owned 
Italian subsidiary, Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (“RAS”).126  RAS 
owned substantial holdings in four subsidiaries of Allianz located 
in Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, and Spain.  Absorbing RAS 
conferred nearly complete ownership of the subsidiaries, 
simplifying Allianz’s structure.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC). 
126 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 
2008) (on file with author). 
127 See infra Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The Organizational Structure of Allianz128 
 
 
Although conversion to the SE took more than one year, it 
formed a necessary step in the absorption of RAS by Allianz.129  
Without the capacity to complete a cross-border merger, Allianz 
could only have acquired RAS through a takeover bid.130  While a 
merger requires the approval of two-thirds of a target’s 
shareholders, a takeover bid requires the cash acquisition of 
nearly all of the target’s shares in order to trigger a squeeze-out 
 
128 Allianz in Europe: Transition to the Societas Europaea 7 (Oct. 16, 2006), 
available at https://www.allianz.com/static-resources/images-2006-12-13/pdf/saobj_ 
1271040_allianz_se_presentation_md_eng2.pdf.  
129 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 3, location not identified (Dec. 3, 2007) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified 
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5, 
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified (Feb. 22, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not 
identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 39, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 65, location not identified (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with 
author).  
130 The Cross-Border Merger Directive had not yet taken effect. See Council 
Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310).   
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process.  National law proscribes the squeeze-out threshold; in 
Italy the threshold is ninety-eight percent.131  Observers say that 
hold-out shareholders would have prevented Allianz from buying 
enough shares in RAS to complete a takeover.132   
b. Creation of Branched Structures 
Other companies have used the SE to merge with their 
international subsidiaries and replace them with branches.  
While subsidiaries must report individually to their national 
regulators,133 branches in some sectors may report jointly to the 
national regulators of their parent companies.134  The 
streamlined supervision that results reduces compliance costs 
and eliminates conflicting obligations.135 
Case 2: Scor (France) 
Scor, the French reinsurance company, created three SEs in 
order to take advantage of the 2005 EU Reinsurance 
Directives,136 which offer combined supervision to reinsurance 
 
131 See Christian E. Decher, Cross Border Mergers: Traditional Structures and 
SE-Merger Structures, 4 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 5, 8–10 (2007); Marco Ventoruzzo, 
Cross-border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and Protection of 
Dissenting Shareholders: Withdrawal Rights Under Italian Law, 4 EUR. CO. & FIN. 
L. REV. 47, 50–55 (2007); Eddy Wymeersch, Do We Need a Law on Groups of 
Companies?, Ghent University Financial Law Institute (2000). 
132 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 3; Interview with Anonymous 
Source No. 4; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5; Interview with Anonymous 
Source No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30; Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 31; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 39; Interview 
with Anonymous Source No. 65. 
133 See, e.g., Second Council Directive, 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (EEC).  
134 See, e.g., Jean Dermine, Presentation at the Conference on Cross-Border 
Banking, Regulatory Challenges: European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart 
Before the Horse (Oct. 11, 2005); European Commission, Supervision of Branches, 
MARKT/G/3/MV D 2 (2007). Even so, the host country remains responsible for 
liquidity issues as well as monetary policies. See Council Directive 2000/12, art. 22, 
2000 O.J. (L 126) 1, 3 (EC). 
135 Ample reasons to retain subsidiaries persist, however. Subsidiaries boast 
limited liability, a separate, “local” legal entity, and predictable tax treatment, 
among other features. See Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration and the 
Societas Europaea: From Host-Country to Home-Country Control, in CROSS-BORDER 
BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 49, 51 (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 2006) 
(“[I]rrespective of the existence of a single market, the international management 
literature predicts that international firms will operate with a mix of branches and 
subsidiaries . . . .”). 
136 See Council Directive 2005/68, 2005 O.J. (L 323) (EC) [hereinafter 
Reinsurance Directives]; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20, location not 
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companies and their branches.137  Reinsurance involves the 
distribution of global risk, and the directives reflect the 
desirability of monitoring the overall strategies of reinsurance 
companies rather than their activities within individual Member 
States.138  Scor converted Scor SA, the French holding company 
at its head, into Scor SE.  Over the next year and a half, it 
established two subordinate SE companies, Scor Global Life SE 
and Scor Global P&C SE; merged into them its German, Italian, 
and Dutch subsidiaries; and established new branches in their 
place.139 
By replacing its subsidiaries with branches, Scor achieved 
not only centralized regulation but also significant savings in 
compliance and corporate governance costs.140  Branches, unlike 
subsidiaries, do not have to file corporate reports, convene 
separate boards,141 or pay VAT taxes on transactions with their 
parent companies.142   
In other sectors, however, the SE would not have provided 
the same benefits.  As one lawyer explained, “[e]ach regulated 
industry is different; selling tractors would be different [because 
the branches of a tractor company would continue to report to 
multiple national regulators].  The SE was sold to the public as a 
one-size fits all tool, and it’s not.”143   
 
indentified (Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 45, location not identified (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with author). 
137 Reinsurance Directives, supra note 136, recital 9 (“This Directive . . . mak[es] 
it possible to grant a single authorisation valid throughout the Community and 
apply the principle of supervision by the home Member State.”); id. art. 15(1) (“The 
financial supervision of a reinsurance undertaking, including that of the business it 
carries on . . . through branches . . . shall be the sole responsibility of the home 
Member State.”). 
138 See id. recital 4. 
139 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 45. 
140 As the CFO of one SE said in an interview, “The FSA tried to make us have 
independent directors in our tiny UK subsidiary. I said go to hell and established a 
branch.” Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20. 
141 See, e.g., Adams v. Cape Indus., (1990) Ch. 433, 536 (A.C.) (U.K.); Case C-
168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 2003 E.C.R. I-9409 ¶ 
32; Case 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Comm’n of European 
Cmtys., 1974 E.C.R. 223 ¶ 37. 
142 See Case C-210/04, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. FCE Bank 
PLC, 2006 E.C.R. I-2803 ¶ 24 (noting that services rendered by a company in one 
member state to its branch in another member state are outside of the scope of 
VAT). 
143 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 45. 
WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete) 4/13/11  5:23 PM 
2010] “AN EVER CLOSER UNION” 1301 
c. Pooling of Regulatory Capital 
Companies that use the SE to replace their subsidiaries with 
branches reduce the amount of money that they must hold in 
reserve.  The Solvency II Directive144 dictates how much 
regulatory capital insurance and reinsurance companies must 
maintain.145  Under the Directive, subsidiaries must set aside 
their own funds, whereas money held by branches counts for the 
parent company.146 
Case 3: Sampo Life (Finland) 
Sampo Life, the Finnish life insurance company, decreased 
its pool of regulatory capital by adopting a branched SE 
structure.  It merged its Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian 
subsidiaries into Sampo Life Insurance Baltic, an SE company 
headquartered in Estonia and established new branches in 
Latvia and Lithuania.147  The money the subsidiaries 
independently held now counts for the company’s total reserves 
because it is located in the SE’s branches.148 
Use of the SE to absorb the subsidiaries, rather than the 
Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, mitigated scrutiny of Sampo 
Life from national supervisors.149  The SE signaled a legitimate, 
European-level restructuring.150  As the CFO of a multinational 
reinsurance company stated, “It’s much brighter to say we’re 
becoming an SE—we consider Europe a unique market and we 
will act through branches—than it is to say we’re pulling out our 
subsidiaries.”151  Other interview subjects in the study similarly 
characterized the SE as an important cover in carrying out 
 
144 Council Directive 2009/138/EC, Solvency II Directive, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1. 
145 Id. 
146 See id. (providing a formula for the calculation of solvency capital 
requirements); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20, location not indentified 
(Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, 
location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 45.    
147 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57, a CFO of a multinational 
reinsurance company, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
148 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 56, location not identified (Mar. 3, 
2008) (on file with author). 
149 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20. 
150 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57. 
151 Id. 
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reorganizations that would otherwise trouble clients and 
regulators.152 
Unlike Scor, however, Sampo Life Insurance Baltic could not 
attain centralized regulation by transforming into a branched 
SE.  Consumer rights remain under national supervision.153  
Sampo Life Insurance Baltic offers three different insurance 
products in order to comply with varying national regulations.154 
d. Consolidation of Operations 
The SE has also allowed companies to move between 
Member States, enabling them to centralize their operations 
without jeopardizing licenses they have previously acquired.155   
Case 4: Swiss Re (Switzerland) 
Swiss Re, the insurance and reinsurance multinational, 
adopted the SE in order to gain access to EU legislation more 
cheaply.  Using the form, it shifted its insurance and reinsurance 
business from their original Swiss headquarters to two new 
Luxembourgian entities.156 
The rules governing SEs enabled Swiss Re to consolidate its 
insurance subsidiaries in Luxembourg without disturbing their 
 
152 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified (Dec. 10, 
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not 
identified (Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 30, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 34, location not identified (Feb. 6, 2008) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on 
file with author).  
153 See Council Directive 1999/44, art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC); Green Paper 
on European Union Consumer Protection, at 7, COM (2001) 531 final (Oct. 2, 2001) 
(“Considerable divergences exist in the laws applied to business-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market, whether resulting from national 
specific regulations, differences in general principles or from different 
jurisprudence.”); Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation 
Concerning Sales Promotions in the Internal Market, at 7, COM (2001) 546 final 
(Oct. 2, 2001) (blaming low cross-border consumer demand on national-level 
regulation). 
154 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57. 
155 Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 4–5 (EC). Following 
the transformation of the Tenth Directive, the cross-border merger is another 
possible mechanism for reincorporating. It allows companies to merge into empty 
companies in other jurisdictions. 
156 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64, location not identified (Apr. 25, 
2008) (on file with author).  
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licenses to conduct business in the U.S.157  The company 
combined its Dutch and British subsidiaries into a British SE, 
moved the SE to Luxembourg, and established a German 
branch.158  British law does not provide for legal mergers, so the 
company used a court-approved transfer of assets and liabilities 
to join the subsidiaries.159  Completing the move without using 
the SE form, however, would have required it to liquidate each 
business, establish new companies in Luxembourg, and apply for 
new licenses.160 
Other companies, however, have undertaken similar 
restructurings without the SE.  Partner Re, another 
multinational reinsurance company, transferred its headquarters 
from Switzerland to Ireland to qualify for the EU Reinsurance 
Directives but did not convert to the SE.161  The company feared 
exposure to employee representation and unpredictability in its 
tax treatment, particularly its rights to offset losses in one 
jurisdiction against its total profits.162  It also believed that 
remedying gaps or problems in the legislation would require it to 
petition national courts one at a time, rather than directly 
lobbying a single body.163 
Swiss Re also used the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, 
rather than the SE, to relocate its reinsurance subsidiaries.  It 
formed a private company in Luxembourg and has gradually 
merged in the subsidiaries.164 
2. Drive To Harmonize Additional Areas of Law 
To reach consensus on the SE, the Member States 
harmonized only the specific aspects of corporate law on which 
they could agree.  While the framework design earned critical 
political support, harmonizing some laws and not others has 
allowed for national laws and regulations to interfere with 
 
157 SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 29. 
158 Id.; see also Interview with Anonymous Source No. 65, location not identified 
(Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author). 
159 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64. 
160 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 65. 
161 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64; see also Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 65. 
162 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23, 
2008) (on file with author). 
163 Id. 
164 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64. 
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potential benefits from conversion to the form.  Individual laws 
can not easily be isolated from the broader systems within which 
they operate.   Without additional harmonization, it is unlikely 
that the SE will attract many companies.  Companies in 
regulated industries without regional supervisory systems have 
few incentives to convert.  Harmonizing additional areas of 
corporate law is therefore essential to improving its viability, if 
that is the primary goal.165 
a. Deposit Guarantees 
Uncoordinated national deposit guarantee schemes have 
discouraged European banks from converting to the SE.  Banks 
must contribute to funds guaranteeing their savings in every 
Member State in which they operate.166  Each one has different 
rules governing banks’ obligations.167  The differences attracted 
attention in the wake of the failure of the Icelandic bank 
Landesbanki.  The British and Dutch governments had to loan 
Iceland money to rescue depositors in the British and Dutch 
branches of the bank.168 
 
165 See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950–1957 xxxiii–xxxiv (1958) (positing spillover pressure to 
expand authority of central institutions into neighboring policy sectors); Malcolm 
Gammie, EU Taxation and the Societas Europaea—Harmless Creature or Trojan 
Horse?, 44 EUR. TAX’N 35, 36 (2004). 
166 Council Directive 94/19, arts. 3–4, 1994 O.J. (L 135) (EC). 
167 For example, the Danish scheme guarantees a maximum of 300,000 Danish 
Krone for ordinary deposits, the Swedish scheme guarantees a maximum of 250,000 
Swedish Krona, and the Norwegian scheme guarantees a maximum of 2,000,000 
Norwegian Krone. IMF, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC REGION: 
CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL POLICIES 52–53 (2007), available at http://www. 
imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2007/nordbal/pdf/0607.pdf. In Denmark, a bank 
makes current payments but is repaid them on withdrawal. See generally 
DANMARKS NATIONAL BANK, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN DENMARK (2005), available at 
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/Publications.nsf/8b8fe2a60c3a10cbc1256be50
057a78e/1e8fec8f259e61ffc125706c003d4409/$FILE/kap19.html. In Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden, banks pay nonrefundable premiums. See Jean Dermine, 
European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart Before the Horse, 58 tbl.12 
(INSEAD, Fontainebleau, Sept. 17, 2005), available at http://www.insead.edu/ 
facultyresearch/faculty/personal/jdermine/research/documents/Chicago2005Dermine
DraftII_000.pdf.  
168 See JAMES K. JACKSON, ICELAND’S FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 
3–4 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location= 
U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA516392; John Goddard, Phil Molyneux & John 
O.S. Wilson, The Financial Crisis in Europe: Evolution, Policy Responses and 
Lessons for the Future, 17 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 362, 368 (2009); Michael 
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Case 5: Nordea Bank (Sweden) 
Nordea Bank, the largest financial services group in the 
Nordic and Baltic regions, publicized its intention to become an 
SE in 2003.169  It planned to convert in order to integrate its 
subsidiaries into a Swedish SE and operate through branches.  
The branched structure would confer centralized supervision, 
savings in compliance and governance expenses, and a larger 
lending base.170  Although banks may not loan more than ten 
percent of their total capital to a single customer, money held by 
branches counts toward the total, while money held in 
subsidiaries does not.171  The financial crisis has, however, raised 
questions over the desirability of allowing large, vertically-
integrated banks that operate through branches.  If they fail, 
individual countries may not have enough money to bail them 
out. 
Nordea never completed the conversion because of costs 
arising from national deposit gaurantee schemes.172  If Nordea 
had become an SE, all of its European deposits would have 
shifted to the Swedish parent company, along with the risks 
associated with them.173  The funds that Nordea had already 
invested in the other countries’ systems, however, would not have 
flowed with the deposits to Sweden.174  This constrained Nordea’s 
plans, as it had already allocated substantial funds in the 
countries’ schemes.175  Nordea petitioned the European 
Commission for a harmonized, European-level system of deposit  
 
 
 
Waibel, Bank Insolvency and Sovereign Insolvency, in CROSS-BORDER BANK 
INSOLVENCY (Rosa Maria Lastra ed., 2011). 
169 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7, location not identified (Feb. 1, 2008) 
(on file with author). 
170 The Second Banking Directive, Directive 89/646/EEC, allows for home 
country supervision of foreign bank branches under a single license. Foreign bank 
subsidiaries continue to be regulated by their host state. See ALFRED LEWIS & GIOIA 
PESCETTO, EU AND US BANKING IN THE 1990S 12–13 (1996). 
171 Council Regulation 2531/98, art. 4, 1998 O.J. (L 318) 1; see also Interview 
with Anonymous Source No. 7. 
172 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8, location not identified (Feb. 1, 2008) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not 
identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
33, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author). 
173 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7. 
174 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8. 
175 Id. 
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guarantees, but issues of national sovereignty in banking 
regulation have so far prevented the Member States from 
reaching a solution.176 
b. National Regulatory Systems and Attitudes 
Further harmonization would also be necessary for the SE  
to attract companies in other industries, including 
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.  Telecommunications 
companies do not receive any benefits from using the SE to adopt 
a branched structure.  They must operate a subsidiary in every 
country in which they do business.177  Member States license 
individual companies, not branches, to operate at specific 
frequencies.178  Pharmaceutical companies must register their 
drugs for use within individual Member States in accordance 
with expensive procedures.179  Allianz, despite becoming an SE, 
left its Italian subsidiary in place because Italy allows only 
independent, Italian license holders to underwrite insurance 
there.180 
Persistent protectionism has led to additional obstacles.  A 
lawyer counseled an executive search company not to convert to 
the SE because regulators in Eastern Europe would block the 
conversion of Eastern European subsidiaries into branches, 
viewing the restructuring as a way to take money out of the 
region.181  Companies House, the government register of British 
companies, notified an Austrian SE that it could not establish a 
 
176 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7. 
177 “Telecommunications companies do not receive any benefits from using the 
SE to adopt a branched structure,” according to a representative of a Swedish 
telecommunications company in an interview for the study. Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 48, location not identified (Feb. 18, 2008) (on file with 
author). “They must operate a subsidiary in every country in which they do 
business,” the representative said. Id. 
178 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46, location not identified (Feb. 19, 
2008) (on file with author). 
179 “Pharmaceutical companies,” according to the lawyer of a German 
multinational pharmaceutical company, “must register their drugs for use within 
individual Member States in accordance with expensive procedures.” Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 44, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
180 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 
2008) (on file with author). 
181 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 47, location not identified (Feb. 18, 
2008) (on file with author). 
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branch in England.182  The suggestion that PepsiCo might buy 
Danone caused French politicians to retain the national “jewel” 
for France.183  In 2007, the German energy company E.ON 
dropped its bid for Endesa, a Spanish utility company, after the 
Spanish government opposed the deal in favor of a rival bid from 
another Spanish company.184  The European Commission 
criticized the actions of Spain to thwart the merger, and referred 
the case to the European Court of Justice.185  “Europe continues 
to fight yesterday’s battles; there is very little community of 
purpose,” stated one policy analyst.186 
c. Corporate Taxation 
Significantly more companies would adopt the SE if it offered 
a system of unified taxation.187  The deficiency in the SE 
legislation has energized discussions of how best to organize 
corporate taxation at the European level.188  A proposal called the 
 
182 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53, location not identified (Mar. 19, 
2008) (on file with author). 
183 See generally Gillian G.H. Garcia, Sovereignty v. Soundness: Cross-
Border/Inter-State Banking in the European Union and the United States: 
Similarities, Differences and Policy Issues, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 109 (2009); 
Deborah Orr, Danone: Not For Sale, FORBES (July 25, 2007, 1:45 PM EST), 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/07/25/danone-pepsi-takeover-cz_do_0725danone.html. 
184 Carter Dougherty, E.ON Lowers Its Sights in Bid for Endesa After Enel’s 
Entry, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 7, 2007, at 14. 
185 Id. 
186 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 15, a policy analyst, location not 
identified (Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author). 
187 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5, 2007) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified 
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5, 
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 25, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on 
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified 
(Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 32, 
location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 33, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 40, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on 
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified 
(Mar. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 51, 
location not identified (May 20, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 66, location not identified (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
188 See, e.g., Roopa Aitken & Chris Morgan, Societas Europaea: Is Tax an 
Incentive or a Barrier?, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2004) (“Because the 
introduction of the SE will not eliminate the current tax problems faced by 
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Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”) has 
received the most popular support,189 and most companies 
interviewed in the study favor it.190  
The absence of harmonized tax provisions has been 
extensively criticized,191 including by the European 
Commission.192  Operating across uncoordinated national tax 
regimes subjects companies to double taxation and under 
taxation, overly tax-driven arrangements, and extra compliance 
costs.193  Currently, each country taxes companies’ subsidiaries 
 
multinational groups, its introduction has fuelled the debate for a more tax efficient 
method for operating within Europe.”). 
The adoption of the European Company . . . has made it more urgent to 
define the tax framework at the European Union level. To become an 
attractive vehicle, it is not enough to ensure that the existing body of 
European Union tax company legislation is fully applicable to the 
European Company. The full benefits in establishing a European Company 
may only be achieved if existing companies can form such a company 
without any imposition of additional tax pre-incorporation expenses and 
avoid the outstanding tax obstacles impeding their cross-border operations. 
TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 176–77. 
189 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 247 (Bela Balassa ed., 1975) (“Although 
the Treaty of Rome does not contain specific provisions on the harmonization of 
[business] taxes, Article 100 of the Treaty may be interpreted as a mandate for 
harmonization.”). 
190 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Towards an Internal Market 
Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-wide Activities, COM (2001) 582 final at 15–19. 
“[T]he Commission has proposed testing the consolidated EU tax base with a 
European Company pilot programme.” 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 99 (Dirk van 
Gerven & Paul Storm eds., 2006). 
191 See, e.g., Gammie, supra note 165; Frits Bolkestein, Commissioner The New 
European Company: Opportunity in Diversity, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, 
DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LAW OF CORPORATIONS 43–44 (Jonathan Rickford ed., 
2003); Celia Hampton, European Company Law Reforms Make Uneven Progress, 
EUROWATCH, Mar. 15, 2002, at 1. 
192 Frits Bolkestein, Member of the Eur. Comm’n in Charge of the Internal Mkt. 
and Taxation, Address to Conference at the University of Leiden: The New 
European Company: Opportunity in Diversity (Nov. 29, 2002).  
I concede that work remains to be done in some areas: in particular, I refer 
to the taxation aspects, which, quite rightly, are of concern to potential 
users . . . . This leaves the SE-Statute without any tax rules. This is a 
rather unfortunate situation, which I regret very much. Clearly, the lack of 
appropriate tax rules significantly reduces the practical attractiveness of 
the European Company Statute. Business representatives emphasize this 
quite forcefully. 
Id. 
193 Marjaana Helminen, The Tax Treatment of the Running of an SE, 44 EUR. 
TAX’N 28, 30 (2004). 
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and branches individually, and companies have no ability to 
consolidate their overall profits and losses.194   
Leaving taxation to national law, however, helped secure the 
passage of the SE legislation.195  Member States with low 
corporate tax rates—including Estonia, with no tax on retained 
earnings; Ireland, with a twelve and a half percent tax rate; and 
Slovakia, with a seventeen percent tax rate—would not have 
supported legislation that would have elimated their competitive 
advantages in regard to corporate taxation.196 
The CCCTB does not affect national tax rates.  It simply sets 
out a common definition for what constitutes a taxable profit and 
procedures for allocating the profit among the Member States.197  
Under the proposed system, a company would aggregate its total 
income according to a uniform set of rules for deductions and 
other accounting issues, assign the income proportionally among 
the locations in which it operated, and pay taxes according to 
national rates.198   
3. U.S. Comparison 
The U.S. has developed a complex regulatory regime with 
competences split between federal, state, and local levels.  
 
194 See, e.g., Roderik Bouwman & Jan Werbrouck, International Tax Aspects of 
the Societas Europaea, in 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 190, at 98, 102.  
The absence of special tax provisions in the Regulation, coupled with the 
principle of equal treatment, means an SE is subject to the tax laws of the 
Member State of which it is considered a resident for tax purposes and, 
when operating internationally, applicable international regulations, 
treaties, and the laws of the (Member) States in which it operates. 
Consequently, as a tax resident of the EU, an SE is potentially subject to 
the tax laws of [thirty] countries. 
Id. 
195 See, e.g., Pieter Sanders, The European Company, 1968 J. BUS. L. 184, 189 
(“The creation of a European company is one thing, the solution of the tax problems 
involved is another.”). 
196 CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUDIES, CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMPANY STATUTE 23 (2008); see also Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations 
Concerning Multijurisdictional Tax Competition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 51–52 (“A 
related Tiebout argument would suggest that tax competition permits jurisdictions 
to specialize in catering to diverse consumer preferences or local needs, such as by 
collectively offering a choice between high-tax, high-service and low-tax, low-service 
options.”). 
197 See Emrah Arbak, Will the CCCTB Be Stillborn?, CTR FOR EUR. POLICY 
STUDIES, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://shop.ceps.eu/book/will-ccctb-be-stillborn. 
198 See id. 
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Constitutionally, states may issue laws and regulations on any 
topic that federal law has not preempted.199  The federal 
government may also delegate the authority to implement 
federal regulatory programs to the states.200 
The U.S. has centralized an increasing amount of regulatory 
power at the federal level.201  Professor Mark J. Roe detailed the 
areas of corporate law that the federal government has 
expropriated from the states: 
Federal securities laws in the 1930s took much of voting away 
from the states, set up the means to take insider trading away 
from the states, and mandated delivery of information to 
shareholders . . . .  In the 1950s, the SEC federalized the proxy 
contests . . . .  The 1960s witnessed the first successful hostile 
takeover, which Congress sought to impede with the Williams 
Act.   
And federal authorities effectively grabbed hold of specific but 
ordinary corporate matters in the 1970s: the rules governing the 
going private transaction—the central corporate transaction of 
that era—were partially federalized . . . [; state] law allowed 
selective stock buybacks [and the SEC reversed it] . . . [; the 
states allowed] voting discrepancies among shareholders [but 
the stock exchanges under SEC pressure reversed them] . . . . 
[For a time] the circuit courts were . . . turning corporate 
fiduciary law . . . into federal law.  While that [diminished, some 
still remains] . . . . 
 
199 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). 
Commercial law is an area of concurrent jurisdiction. See Ernest A. Young, Dual 
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 139, 150–52 (2001). Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law will 
govern when the federal government acts. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a 
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665–66 
(2001). For further information about the various ways in which the federal 
government can preempt the states, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL 
PREEMPTION: REGULATORY FEDERALISM (2005). 
200 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and ‘Dual Sovereignty’ Doesn’t, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 813, 866–68 (1998); Weiser, supra note 199, at 671. 
201 See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at xviii (“For most of the twentieth 
century, power and regulatory responsibility shifted inexorably from the states to 
Washington. But, over the past two decades, ‘new federalists’ have argued for a 
reallocation of regulatory authority from the federal government back to the states 
and even to local government.”); Landau, supra note 9; U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: THE MIXED RECORD OF THE 1980S (1993). 
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[N]ew securities rules [in the 1990s] obliterated parallel state 
law [by expressly preempting the states.]  And Sarbanes-Oxley, 
reflecting congressional urgency [in 2002] to react to the Enron 
scandals, [mandates] a host of corporate governance matters—
from the power of the audit committee to [management 
construction of] internal control systems, to the micro-details of 
loans to managers . . . .  [A]ll [these were] once province[s] of 
state law.202 
As regards bank deposit guarantees, the Glass Steagall Act 
of 1933203 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), which guarantees the checking and savings deposits of 
state and federally chartered banks at the federal level.204  The 
Act was designed to restore public trust in the banking system 
following the Great Depression.205  To qualify for its protections, 
banks must comply with specific liquidity and reserve 
requirements.206  Bank failures during the 1980s and 1990s 
tested the FDIC system.  While no serious bank runs occurred, 
taxpayers and surviving banks paid $36 billion to support failed 
banks, and regulators allowed profitable banks to enter 
speculative real estate deals.207 
Corporate taxation in the U.S. occurs at both the federal and 
state level.  Tax revenues have played an important role in state 
finances.  The 1870 federal census indicates that Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania earned more than half their total tax revenues 
from companies.208  The expansion in out-of-state markets, 
through catalog sales and the internet, has made apportionment 
of tax revenues among states increasingly difficult.209  To 
 
202 Roe, supra note 22, at 646.   
203 The Glass Steagall Act is the popular name for sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of 
the Banking Act of 1933, which has since been repealed. It is codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (seventh), 78, 377, 378(a) (2006). 
204 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION 22–23 (1992); Lewis & Pescetto, supra note 170, at 73. 
205 See, e.g., Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable 
Expansion of Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 335, 336 n.3 (1994). 
206 12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh) (2006 & Supp. II). 
207 FDIC, 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 25 (1997). 
208 See FRANCIS A. WALKER, U.S. CENSUS OFFICE, THE NINTH CENSUS 640 
(1872). 
209 See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause requires physical presence in state for sales and use taxes); 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that states may 
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increase their revenues, the states have considered adopting a 
combined reporting system that would allow states that provide 
services to out-of-state companies to levy taxes and would create 
a process for coordinating corporate tax policies.210 
Both the U.S. and Europe appear to be moving towards 
increased centralization and regionalization in law and face 
similar challenges in coordinating multi-level regimes for modern 
companies. 
B. Introducing Regulatory Competition? 
Although the original purpose of the SE was to provide 
companies with a unified body of European law,211 the myriad 
references to national law in the final legislation212 combine  
with the ability that it affords companies to reincorporate213 to 
create new opportunities for Member States to compete for 
incorporations.  Many commentators therefore predicted that the 
SE would introduce a more American-style commercial market to 
Europe.214  In reality, many factors constrain companies from 
using the SE as a vehicle for regulatory competition, and only 
minimal inter-state arbitrage has resulted. 
Unlike the U.S., which allows companies to incorporate and 
reincorporate in any state they choose, regardless of the 
connections that they have to it,215 the EU has long sought to 
prevent competition for corporate charters among the Member 
States.216  European policymakers have believed that the creation 
 
not impose taxes on corporations of other states disproportionate to their contacts 
with the taxing state). 
210 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK FOR 
STATE LEGISLATORS 37, 43 (2d ed. 2003). 
211 See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82. 
212 SE Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53, 
54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2). 
213 Id. art. 8; see also TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11.  
214 See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 549; McCahery & Vermeulen, supra 
note 20; Stith, supra note 20.  
215 See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 825–27. The states must recognize 
corporations incorporated in other jurisdictions, and the law of the state of 
incorporation governs disputes, wherever they may occur.  
216 See, e.g., Robert R. Drury, The “Delaware Syndrome”: European Fears and 
Reactions, 6 J. BUS. L. 709, 723 (2005). See generally Heine & Kerber, supra note 9, 
at 47; RAYMOND CANNON, BUSINESS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?A PRACTICE 
GUIDE § 6.01(1) (1996); Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to Uniformity in 
Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2161 (1991) (“The founders of the 
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of a “race” among the Member States217 would encourage overly-
permissive regulation,218 rather than promote innovation.  Most 
Member States have blocked companies from relocating219 by 
requiring them to register in the same place in which they 
establish their headquarters.220 
The SE, however, made it legal221 for companies to 
reincorporate.222  According to article 8 of the SE Regulation:  
 
Community had no intention of letting one of the member states become the 
‘Delaware of Europe.’ ”). 
217 See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (noting that Justice Brandeis 
coined the phrase “race to the bottom”); see also Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping 
and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union from Delaware, 25 
EUR. L. REV. 57, 61 (2000). 
218 See, e.g., Stefan Grundmann, Regulatory Competition in European Company 
Law—Some Different Genius?, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EURO: 
CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED COMPANIES AND REGULATION 561, 562–63, 
565 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002); Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo 
Vadis?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 257, 269 (2000). 
219 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 40, arts. 54(3)(g) (now TEC art. 44(3)(g)), 220 
(now TEC art. 293); Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: 
What Role for the EC? 5 (Univ. of Bologna, Working Paper No. 53/2005, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=850005. 
220 See, e.g., ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 20 
(1995); Mathias Siems, Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law: 
European Company Law in the 21st Century, 27 EUR. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002). See 
generally THE EUROPEAN FOUNDATION: A NEW LEGAL APPROACH (Klaus J. Hopt et 
al. eds., 2006). 
221 Following the transformation of the Tenth Directive, the cross-border merger 
is another possible mechanism for reincorporating. It allows companies to merge 
into empty companies in other jurisdictions. 
222 Most national legislatures providing for the international transfer of seat 
require  
that the transfer to another Member State of a company registered in their 
territory—and consequently subject to their laws—should be accompanied 
by the dissolution of the company at stake, as well as the constitution of the 
company in the Member State of arrival according to its national laws. This 
operation implies a change of the applicable law to the company, and 
therefore, the loss of its legal personality. Without the continuity of the 
legal personality of the company, there is in reality no transfer of seat, but 
a sole dissolution and subsequent re-formation of the company. 
See, e.g., TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 50. 
For decades, the transfer of the seat of a company has been the subject of 
controversy in European company law. Although the subject was expressly 
mentioned in the European Treaty, experts have not been able to agree on 
a workable solution. Also, in most States, national company law has not 
been able to come forward with acceptable solutions. As a consequence, 
companies were prevented from enjoying the same freedom of movement as 
natural persons, and this notwithstanding their express assimilation in the 
Treaty. 
Wymeersch, supra note 8, at 661 (internal citations omitted). 
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“The registered office of an SE may be transferred to another 
Member State . . . [and] shall not result in the winding up of the 
SE or in the creation of a new legal person.”223  The provision 
allows Member States to compete in the legal fields the SE leaves 
to national law, which include directors’ liability, insolvency, 
auditing, and criminal rules.   
Few companies have actually used the SE to move and take 
advantage of differences in national legal systems.  Based on my 
empirical data, it appears that several factors dissuade them.  
The companies that have reincorporated have done so for unique 
reasons and others that are similar and have transformed into 
SEs have not moved.  The complete legislation and the context in 
which it operates limit the benefits that companies can attain 
from relocating.224 
1. Preconditions 
Article 7 of the SE Regulation discourages companies from 
moving.225  It requires them to locate their registered office and 
head office in the same Member State, in line with the real seat 
principle.226  Many companies I interviewed explained that they 
would have considered reincorporating if they did not also have 
to move their headquarters.227 
 
223 See SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 8. 
224 See, e.g., Heine & Kerber, supra note 9, at 64 (“[D]ue to the above-mentioned 
path dependences much time will be needed, before a dynamic competition process 
can develop, and it can be expected that this competition will have to tackle with a 
whole set of serious problems.”). 
225 SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 7. 
226 Although the ECJ seemed to suggest in Centros that the real seat theory 
might contravene the right to free establishment, in 2009 the ECJ affirmed the 
legality of the theory in the Cartesio case. See Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és 
Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641. 
227 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5, 
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not 
identified (Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 5, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on 
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 16, location not identified 
(Dec. 12, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 17, 
location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on 
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified 
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46, 
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Transferring headquarters to a different country is difficult 
for companies.  Smaller companies tend to be embedded in their 
local economies, and sufficient numbers of their employees may 
not be willing to move to other Member States.228  Larger 
companies tend to have political ties to their countries, and 
relocating may carry political consequences.229  Moving a head 
office can also attract negative publicity.230  A representative of a 
Finnish company stated that it considered moving its 
headquarters to avoid lenient mandatory bidding requirements 
in Finland231 but decided not to because “headquarters are 
political.”232 
Case Study 6: Narada (Norway) 
Narada, the battery manufacturing company originally 
based in Norway, moved an SE company from Norway to the UK, 
in the absence of such concerns.  It structured a joint venture 
with its main customer, the Norwegian telecommunications  
 
 
 
 
 
location not identified (Feb. 19, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with 
author). But see Enriques, supra note 16, at 80 (“The provision requiring the SE’s 
registered office to be located in the same Member State as its central 
administration . . . should be no serious obstacle to using the SE as a vehicle for 
company law shopping.”). 
228 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 
655 (1999) (“Language and culture are important constraints. Even after the 
Common Market, Europe is criss-crossed by national borders that, as a social 
matter, restrict the mobility of labor. Hence, labor is more resistant to corporate 
migration in Europe than in the United States.”). 
229 See, e.g., Stith, supra note 20, at 1611.   
230 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence 
in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) 
(discussing “sources of path dependence in a country’s patterns of corporate 
ownership structure”). 
231 In Finland, a shareholder’s obligation to make an offer for all of a listed 
company’s outstanding shares had not been triggered until the shareholder attained 
two-third of total voting power, a very high threshold. See Securities Market Act 
(1989/495) chap. 10, § 4 (Fin.), superseded by Council Directive 2004/25, art. 1, 2004 
O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC). When Finland implemented the EU Takeover Directive in Bill 
HE 6/2006, it reduced its mandatory bid rule to a dual threshold of 30% and 50% of 
voting rights. 
232 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46. 
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company Eltek, as an SE to allow for flexibility to hire staff in 
any country in Europe.  After selecting a British manager, it 
transferred the SE to the UK.233 
2. Costs 
Exit taxes, dissenters’ rights, and labor negotiations increase 
the cost of using the SE to move.  Many companies initially 
interested in reincorporating have found the process to be too 
expensive after a full investigation of the requirements.  Those 
that have moved have contributed to the convergence of the laws 
of the Member States. 
While the SE eliminates legal barriers to relocating,234 the 
legislation does not address obstacles posed by national 
taxation.235  Taxes that Member States levy on exiting companies 
challenge their freedom of movement.236  Germany, for example, 
requires companies that relocate to pay full liquidation taxes.237  
Only one Member State, Portugal, does not charge exit taxes.238  
 
233 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 69, location not identified (Mar. 
12, 2008) (on file with author). 
234 See Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(1), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 4. 
235 Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministere de l’Economie, 
2004 E.C.R. 1-2409, however, has raised questions over the legality of exit taxes. 
While the European Court of Justice made a clear distinction between people and 
corporations, it held that France could not charge exiting residents taxes that it did 
not apply to domestic residents without violating the Freedom of Establishment. See 
id. at 1-2409 [70]. 
236 See, e.g., Bouwman & Werbrouck, supra note 194, at 104; see also TAVARES & 
BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 161. 
[Despite] Article 8 of the Regulation . . . , the majority of the Member 
States continue to tax such transfer as if the company was being wounded 
up or liquidated.  
The reason for this widespread practice is that, in most Member States, 
with the transfer of the company’s registered office to another Member 
State, i.e., the host State, the SE will cease to be subject to unlimited tax 
liability in the home country. Therefore the objective is to prevent any 
capital gains, which have accrued in the home State, evading taxation. The 
taxation of capital gains upon the transfer of the company’s registered 
office to another Member State is the last chance to tax the appreciation 
and gains in such assets upon their actual transfer. 
Id. For additional authority, see Anne Fairpo, Societas Europaea and Mobility, 892 
TAX J. 24, 24 (2007). 
237 See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], Oct. 19, 2002, BGBI. I 
at 4210, § 95 (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/ 
estg/gesamt.pdf. 
238 See INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SURVEY ON THE SOCIETAS 
EUROPAEA 26 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/ 
documents/survey.pdf.  
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A 2005 European directive,239 however, allows companies that 
maintain a presence to which their assets can be attributed for 
continuing taxation to defer their payment of capital gains.240 
Case Study 7: Prosafe (Norway) 
Prosafe, the Norwegian shipping company, found it 
expensive to use the SE to reincorporate.241  The company moved 
to Cyprus to avoid changes to the national tonnage tax system in 
Norway.242  In 1996, Norway adopted a permissive scheme of 
tonnage taxation to enable the country to develop as a 
competitive shipping base.243  It did not tax the operating profits 
of companies unless they paid taxable dividends to shareholders 
or moved their assets out of the country.244  In September 2006, 
however, the government announced a new plan to reclaim the 
tax credits.  It demanded payment on all tax liabilities deferred 
under the 1996 law over a period of ten years and moved to 
impose forward taxes on shipping companies.245 
Prosafe paid the full amount of its deferred tax liabilities 
when it left Norway.246  Since the reincorporation, Norway has 
 
239 Directive 2005/19/EC, amending Council Directive 90/434/EEC on a common 
system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfer of assets and exchanges 
of shares concerning companies of different Member States. Directive 2005/19/EC, 
2005 O.J. (L 58) 19.   
240 Id. tit. IVb, arts. 10b–10d. 
241 The SE enabled Prosafe to avoid the capital gains taxes it shareholders would 
have paid, though, had it needed to establish a brand new company in Cyprus, buy 
it, and liquidate the Norwegian company. By using the SE, Prosafe could continue 
business without interruption. See Paul Storm, The Societas Europaea: A New 
Opportunity?, in 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 190, at 3, 11 (detailing 
cumbersome administrative procedures for moving a head office but emphasizing the 
lack of need to wind up the old company or create a new legal personality). 
242 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 52, location not identified (Feb. 21, 
2008) (on file with author). 
243 “The special rules for taxation of shipping companies were adopted with 
effect as from 1996 and laid down in section 51A of the law on wealth and income 
tax No. 8 of 18 August 1911. . . . The rates of the tonnage tax were set out in chapter 
5 of the Annual Tax Decree by the Parliament.” EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Norway, 
143/03/COL (2006). For a discussion of the changes in 2006 to the tonnage tax 
system that had been in place in Norway since 1996, see Wikborg Rein’s Shipping 
Offshore: Update 1/2008, at 28, available at http://www.wr.no/storage/ 
Magasiner/SO_1_2008_screen.pdf.  
244 See Lov om Skatt av Formue og Inntekt (Law on Wealth and Income Tax) 
§ 51A, no. 8 (Aug. 18, 1911). 
245 See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Proposed Amendments to the 
Norwegian Special Tax Regime for Shipping Companies (Oct. 9, 2007). 
246 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 52. 
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passed additional legislation taxing exiting companies as if their 
full valuation has been realized.247  Odjfell, another Norwegian 
shipping company, converted to the SE in order to leave Norway 
but so far remains incorporated there.248 
The SE legislation also authorizes Member States to  
adopt procedures for compensating shareholders who oppose 
reincorporation and to establish protections for creditors.249  The 
 
247 “In 2007 Norway introduced new exit taxation rules adopting a new section 
10-71 of the Tax Act, making SE companies subject to an exit tax when moving their 
effective management or tax residency from Norway to another country. On March 
10 2010, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”) issued a letter of formal notice to 
Norway for failing to comply with its obligation under articles 31, 34 and 40 of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA”) by imposing an immediate 
taxation on companies that transfer their seat or assets and liabilities to another 
EEA state and on the shareholders of such companies and for breach of the SE 
Regulation.” ESA Issues Formal Notice About Exit Tax, INT’L TAX R., June 1, 2010, 
at 88.  
Effective from 7 October 2008 new exit tax rules were implemented in 
Norway. Pursuant to these rules exit tax will be levied when tangible or 
intangible assets are moved out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction, based on 
the market value of the assets. However, if the assets are moved within the 
EEA, the tax payable on tangible assets (except for merchandise) may be 
deferred provided: (i) the assets maintain within the EEA and (ii) there is a 
tax treaty in force between the EEA Member State and Norway, which 
provides for the exchange of information and assistance in regard to 
collection of tax. The exit tax for tangible assets is annulled if the asset is 
not realised within five years. For intangible assets and merchandise the 
exit tax is definitive and is payable on the day of exit. This rule also applies 
on emigration of a company from Norway. If a company ceases to be a 
resident in Norway for tax purposes under the Norwegian Tax Act section 
2-2 or under a tax treaty, the emigration from Norway will mean that 
gains/loss on the assets are subject to tax/are tax deductible as if the asset 
or liability was realised. However, if the company continues to be subject to 
tax in Norway through a permanent establishment after the emigration, no 
capital gains taxation will take place after the exit. Such tax exemption is 
only available on application to the Ministry of Finance under section 11-21 
of the Norwegian Tax Act. The emigration of a company will also be 
considered as a realisation on the hands of the shareholders at the time of 
exit.  
KPMG, TAX FACTS NORWAY 2009: A SURVEY OF THE NORWEGIAN TAX SYSTEM 20, 
available at http://www.kpmg.no/arch/_img/9484126.pdf.  
248 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 54, location not identified (Mar. 6, 
2008) (on file with author). 
249 See Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(2)–(4), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 5 (EC) 
(endowing creditors with prior information rights); id. art. 8(16) (allowing creditors 
to litigate claims arising prior to the transfer in the departure State); id. art. 8(15) 
(blocking transfers when proceedings for winding up, liquidation, insolvency, or 
suspension of payments have taken place). Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(7), 
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 5, (EC) also allows Member States to legislate additional rules. 
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cost of complying is unpredictable, making it difficult for 
companies to evaluate the merits of a potential move.  
Furthermore, the formula that the SE Directive sets out for 
negotiating employee representation carries additional costs.  
Employees from different countries have varied experience in 
participating in labor negotiations, and the process can be 
unwieldy in practice. 
Case Study 8: Elcoteq (Finland) 
Elcoteq, the electronics manufacturing company previously 
located in Finland, and the main supplier to Nokia, the Finnish 
electronics company, was the first company in Europe to convert 
to the SE for the purpose of moving its headquarters.250  In 2005, 
Elcoteq’s shareholders approved the reincorporation of the 
company in Luxembourg.251  It merged its Finnish parent 
company with its Luxembourgian subsidiary to create a 
Luxembourgian SE and then established branches in 
Switzerland and Finland.252  The new company retained its 
original Estonian and Hungarian subsidiaries.253 
Elcoteq had difficulties recruiting talented employees to 
Finland.254  At the time of the conversion, only one percent of the 
company’s workforce lived in Finland, and most of its officers 
worked from Switzerland.255 
The bilateral tax treaty between Luxembourg and 
Switzerland, however, primarily motivated the move.256  The 
treaty eliminates taxes at the level of the head office on income 
the company allocates to the Swiss branch.  Interest on loans 
provided by the Swiss branch also qualify as a cost for tax 
purposes, reducing the company’s overall taxable income.257 
 
For example, under SE-Ausfuhrungsgestz [SEAG], Dec. 12, 2004, BGBl. I, § 13(1) 
(Ger.), creditors are entitled to a deposit security. 
250 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 8, 
2008) (on file with author). 
251 See id. 
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 See id.; see also Aitken & Morgan, supra note 188 (stating that because tax 
treatment of an SE is equivalent to that of a national private limited company “the 
relevant double tax treaties concluded between the country and other countries will 
apply to an SE”).  
257 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 196, at 58–59.   
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Shareholders who opposed the move had the right to sell 
their shares to the company.258  Elcoteq could not determine in 
advance how many shareholders would object and therefore how 
much the reincorporation would cost.259  The SE legislation also 
did not address whether the dissenting shareholders were 
entitled to the average share price during the time period leading 
up to the shareholder vote or the price on the day of the vote.260 
The move from Finland to Luxembourg stimulated 
convergence in the countries’ laws.261  Like most of Europe, but 
not Luxembourg, Finland does not prescribe a nominal share 
value.262  During negotiations related to the move, Luxembourg 
repealed its rules, aligning itself with the rest of the continent.263  
Luxembourg has also legislated a “one share-one vote” 
requirement,264 while Finland has not.265  Elcoteq amended its 
share structure to comply with Luxembourg’s rule.266  The 
 
[T]he main mechanism for such [non-mandatory] harmonization is a web of 
more than 1,500 bilateral tax treaties that provide complicated rules for 
coordinating the claims of ‘source’ countries where income is earned and 
‘residence’ countries where business owners are found. However, rather 
than emerging spontaneously without broader harmonizing institutions, 
these treaties generally follow, in their broad outlines, a set of model 
treaties first developed in the 1920s through intensive multilateral 
negotiations under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and the League of Nations. The global setting of these agreements lowered 
transaction costs for individual countries to agree on specific terms of 
mutual forbearance. In addition, to businesses that were anxious to avoid 
double taxation, the global institutions offered a forum at once more 
favourable than national politics and yet able to be leveraged into such 
politics through the argument: this is what everyone else is doing; you’d 
better join the club. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  
258 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63. 
259 See id. 
260 See id.  
261 See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in 
European Company Law 1–3 (ESRC Centre for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 
163, 2000) (questioning whether regulatory competition strengthens diversity or 
leads to convergence). 
262 See Osakeyhtiölaki [Limited Liability Companies Act] (624/2006) ch. 3, § 5(2), 
(3) (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060624.pdf 
(unofficial translation) [hereinafter LLCA].  
263 See Loi du 10 août 1915 Concernant Les Societes Commerciales, modifié avec 
effet 31 déc. 2006 [Law of Aug. 10, 1915 Concerning Commercial Companies, 
amended with effect Dec. 31, 2006], SERVICE CENTRAL DE LEGISLATION (Lux.). 
264 See id. § IV, art. 46. 
265 See Limited Liability Companies Act, supra note 262,  ch. 3, §§ 1(2)(1), 3(1). 
266 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 8, 
2008) (on file with author). 
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company had originally issued two series of shares, with the 
shares held by the founders carrying ten times the votes of the 
other series.267   
In addition, the SE’s provisions for employee representation 
exposed Eastern European Member States to Finland’s robust 
protections on workers’ rights.  Elcoteq struggled to negotiate 
with representatives from its Baltic subsidiaries whose language 
frequently lacked translations for basic collective bargaining 
terms.268  The company also had to pause negotiations while some 
countries drafted laws establishing a process for selecting 
employee representatives.269  The SE legislation required them to 
be elected pursuant to national legislation.270 
3. Limits 
Although the SE has made reincorporation legal, in the 
absence of a U.S.-style internal affairs doctrine,271 companies 
derive few rewards from relocating.  Consequently, companies 
have shown caution in using the form to move.  By contrast, 
numerous startup companies have registered in the UK to gain 
other advantages the jurisdiction offers,272 following the recent 
case law of the ECJ.273   
Most European business and labor regulations apply based 
on where a company operates, not where it incorporates.274  Many 
aspects of the securities laws pertain to where shares are 
traded,275 and a company pays taxes everywhere it earns 
income.276   
 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id.  
271 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
272 See infra Figure 3. 
273 See generally Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999 E.C.R. I-01459; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155; C-208/00, Überseering BV v. 
Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 94. 
274 See, e.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND 
OPERATION 435–36 (1997). 
275 See, e.g., Deakin, supra note 261, at 23. But see Prospectus Directive 2003/71, 
2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC).  
276 See, e.g., Bouwman & Werbrouk, supra note 194 (“[A]n SE is potentially 
subject to the tax laws of [thirty] countries.”); Helminen, supra note 193, at 29 
(“Consequently, the introduction of the SE legal form will not eliminate the fact that 
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The majority of registered SEs do not yet operate.277  These 
“shelf companies” (“shelfs”) exist legally but do not conduct 
business or employ any workers.  Private companies, such as 
Foratis AG in Germany, create the empty corporate structures to 
sell.278  Their customers can move the shelfs into other Member 
States and put them into operation.  The pre-made forms, 
established according to the laws of a different Member State, 
appeal to companies in Member States with complicated rules for 
forming SEs.  Conducting business through a company that was 
once a shelf also saves the buyers time and, in some jurisdictions, 
increases access to investment capital and other contracts.279 
So far, only four companies have converted a shelf into an 
operational company,280 and many commentators cite the large 
number of shelfs to dismiss the usefulness of the SE.281  The 
proportion of SE companies that conduct business, however, 
appears to be growing.282  The remaining shelfs could be moved 
 
each company engaged in cross-border activities in the EU Single Market must 
comply with a large number of different national tax regimes.”).   
277 See ETUI, Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18.   
278 See, e.g., Beiten Burkhardt, Beiten Burkhardt Establishes Its Own European 
PLC (2005), http://www.bblaw.com/uploads/media/European_PLC.pdf. 
279 See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 
25, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55, location 
not identifies (Feb. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous 
Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
280 Atrium Erste Europaische VV SE became Convergence CT SE, Atrium 
Funfte Europaische VV SE became Donata Holding SE, Pro-Jura 0407 SE became 
Orchestra Service SE, see ERNST & YOUNG, SOCIETE D’AVOCATS, STUDY ON THE 
OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY appx. 2 
(2009), and Sarpedon 2006/01 Vermogensverwaltungs became Max Boegl 
International SE. See generally SEEUROPE, SES IN EUROPE (2008), available at 
http://www.worker-participation.eu/content/download/1818/14558/. 
281 See, e.g., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, CORPORATE TAXATION AND 
THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE, CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (2008); Interview 
with Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 15, location not identified (Feb. 7, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 17, location not 
identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 25, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan, 22, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 33, location not identified (Feb. 4, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not 
identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on file with author).  
282 See infra Figure 3. 
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and activated at any time, suggesting the potential for future 
relocations.283 
 
Figure 3. Operating vs. Non-operating SEs284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, many new companies have established 
themselves in the UK in order to access its capital markets and 
judicial system.  Between 2003 and 2006, more than 67,000 
foreign entities registered British private limited companies 
(“plcs”).  Most came from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.285  The low-cost German airline, Air Berlin, for example, 
registered as a UK plc, went public, and listed on the German 
DAX.286  British plcs avoid employee representation rules, 
although workers must continue to serve on the boards of 
subsidiaries located in countries that require representation.287   
 
283 It should also be noted that SE Regulation art. 14, para. 1, mandated the 
Member States to implement the SE Directive prior to October 8, 2004. On that 
date, however, only five member states—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden—had done so. See SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 14, para. 1. 
284 See EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, supra note 117. 
285 Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms 
Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry 2 (ECGI, Working Paper No. 
70/2006, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906066. 
286 See Volker Triebel & Christopher Horton, Will More English PLCs Take Off 
in Germany?, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 2006, at 34, 36. 
287 See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in 
European Company Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 190, 205–06; Cheffins, 
supra note 274, at 441–42. 
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The first-order incorporations in the UK have also prompted 
convergence among the laws of the Member States.  France,288 
Spain,289 Germany,290 and the Netherlands291 have all recently 
eliminated or lowered their minimum capital requirements to 
match the UK’s more lenient standards.292  The Dutch and 
German consultation documents explicitly reference the need to 
compete with the UK.293  Germany has also begun to allow new 
companies to establish themselves according to the same terms 
the UK offers,294 and the Dutch Parliament has launched a 
review of its private limited company law.295   
4. U.S. Comparison 
In the U.S., although the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution provides for federal authority over matters of 
corporate law,296 an informal understanding, the “internal affairs 
doctrine,” assigns to state law matters that pertain to the 
“internal affairs” of corporations.297  The “internal affairs” include 
the relationships among directors, officers, and investors.298  
 
288 See Loi 2003-721 du 1 août 2003 pour l’initiative économique [Law No. 2003-
721 of August 1, 2003 Economic Initiative], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2003, p. 13464. 
289 See Ulrich Seibert, Close Corporations—Reforming Private Company Law: 
European and International Perspectives, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 83, 87 (2007). 
290 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Neuregelung des Mindestkapitals der GmbH [MindestkapG] [Draft Bill of the 
Government, Draft Law on the Reform of the Minimum Capital of the Limited 
Company] (2005) [hereinafter Draft Reform Law], available at http://www.bmj.de/ 
media/archive/950.pdf. 
291 See Hylda Boschma et al., The Reform of Dutch Private Company Law: New 
Rules for the Protection of Creditors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 567, 569 n. 1 (2007); 
Final Report of the Expert Group, Simplification of Company (BV) Law, May 6, 
2004, available at http://english.ez.nl/english/Subjects/Simplification_of_Company_ 
BV_Law.htm. 
292 See Seibert, supra note 289.   
293 See Draft Reform Law, supra note 288. 
294 See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur 
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen [MoMiG] [Limited Liability Company Law and 
Abuse of Modernization Struggle Act] May 23, 2007, § A, available at 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/2109/MoMiG-RegE%2023%C2005%2007.pdf; see also 
Patrick C. Leyens, German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future 
Challenges, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1407, 1412–13 (2005). 
295 See supra note 291. 
296 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2005). 
297 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
298 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971); see also 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (“It thus is an accepted 
part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to 
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Each state offers its own system of corporate rules, and 
companies may incorporate anywhere, regardless of their 
connections to a particular state.  The other states must 
recognize companies registered elsewhere; the law of the state of 
incorporation governs disputes, no matter where they occur.299 
The desirability of the charter market and whether it has 
caused a race to the top or to the bottom in corporate law has 
long been debated.  Companies pay franchise taxes and 
additional fees to states in order to incorporate, which introduces 
the potential for state competition to attract their business.300  
Over time, however, Delaware has become the state of choice for 
the significant majority of incorporated and incorporating 
companies.  It has built up specialized courts accustomed to 
adjudicating complicated corporate matters and a rich store of 
precedent case law, which has promoted foreseeable outcomes 
and stability in the law.  Today, Delaware is home to over fifty 
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
and almost sixty percent of Fortune 500 companies.301 
 
 
prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing 
their shares.”); Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645 (“The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of 
laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships 
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and 
shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting 
demands.”); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 30–32 (1987); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162 (1985); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From 
Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2000) (“In the 
United States, the law of a corporation’s state of incorporation almost always 
governs its management and control arrangements.”). 
299 See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 825–27.   
300 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 15–
16 (1993); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 548–49 (1990); Heine & Kerber, supra note 9 
(“Historically this system had never been designed deliberately, but emerged in the 
context of the fight against trusts and monopolies at the end of the nineteenth 
century, when the government of New Jersey attempted to give monopolies and 
trusts a new home—in exchange for the payment of a tax for using the corporate 
law. So, the incentive of the states to engage in charter competition is the raising of 
the ‘franchise tax.’ ” (citations omitted)); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and 
Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 195 (1993). 
301 See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000).  
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Theorists who believe the convergence on Delaware 
represents the conclusion of a race to the bottom argue that 
regulatory competition among the states has caused Delaware to 
adopt pro-management rules, to the detriment of shareholder 
rights.  Others see a race to the top in corporate law and credit 
market forces with promoting innovation and experimentation, 
which have led to efficiency gains.302 
Reincorporating in Delaware has costs.  Delaware charges 
higher franchise taxes than other states, and companies that do 
not actually conduct business there must pay additional fees to 
the states in which they operate.303  A relocating company must 
pay filing charges and hold a shareholder meeting for approval of 
the move.304  Privately-held companies reincorporate by merging 
with a shell corporation registered in Delaware.305  Any 
shareholder who votes against the merger can exercise appraisal 
rights and receive the full cash value of his shares.306 
The preeminence of Delaware also remains subject to the 
threat of federal preemption and other mechanisms of federal 
control.307  Although the U.S. has no federal statute for corporate 
law,308 from the Securities Act of 1933309 to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
302 Early proponents of these opposing views were William Cary and Ralph 
Winter. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–40 (1991); William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). Others have made 
efficiency arguments against charter competition. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442–43 (1992). Some have emphasized the 
interest groups involved in the competition. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 469, 469–70 (1987). 
303 See ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34. 
304 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (West 2010); ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34. 
305 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 252; ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34. 
306 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262; see, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34. 
307 See Roe, supra note 22, at 598–99; see also Landau, supra note 9, at 32–33. 
308 This is not for lack of trying. At the Constitutional Convention, James 
Madison proposed a scheme for federal incorporation, JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (1966), and President 
Theodore Roosevelt also called for federal regulation of corporations. THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT, First Annual Message, in THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 15, 81, 
92 (Herman Hagedorn ed., 1926). A Federal Bureau of Corporations existed between 
1890 and 1912. See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in 
the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982) (discussing the history of 
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Act of 2002,310 federal legislation has long competed with 
Delaware and displaced its less optimal rules.  When the federal 
government has intervened, it has generally done so as a 
monopoly legislator and entirely preempted the states.311  Thus, 
corporate law in the U.S. has alternated between two extreme 
poles:  It has either been entrusted to unfettered inter-state 
competition or has been relinquished to a central, monopolistic 
actor.312 
The SE, however, appears unlikely to contribute 
substantially to the creation of a “European Delaware.”  Unlike 
in the U.S., SE companies must demonstrate a connection to the 
Member State in which they incorporate and pay other fees, 
without gaining many advantages in return. 
C. Threatening Social Europe? 
Because the SE legislation did not preempt national laws, 
companies may convert to the form in order to substitute its  
rules for national requirements.  As SEs, they can select between 
a one-tier or two-tier board313 and renegotiate employee 
representation,314 raising concerns that they will adopt the form 
to arbitrage around national standards for workers’ rights.315  In 
fact, while some European companies have adopted one-tier 
board structures, and others have used the SE to decrease the 
 
federal incorporation law). The Depression brought renewed calls for a federal 
corporations law. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and SEC Chairman William O. 
Douglas attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Congress to pass a law instituting 
federal incorporation during Roosevelt’s second term. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 205 (3d ed. 2003). Congress, 
instead, introduced the Federal Securities Acts. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. 
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–62 (2003). It should also be noted that Erie Railrod Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80–81 (1938), overturned Justice Story’s Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. 1 (1842), holding that federal courts could apply rules of general commercial 
law. 
309 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa 
(2006)). 
310 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
311 See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280–81 (1987). 
312 See Legal Diversity, supra note 19, at 14–15. 
313 SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 38. 
314 See Council Directive 2001/86/EC, § II, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 24–27; Leca, supra 
note 92, at 417; Teichmann, supra note 103, at 1333. 
315 See supra note 21. 
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size of their supervisory boards and appoint foreign works to 
them, the costs have been high and labor unions are adapting.  
The interview data suggest that the SE will contribute to an 
eventual equilibrium of smaller, more international supervisory 
boards and more regionalized labor strategies.  Even though 
companies are using the SE to relax employee representation, 
those accustomed to codetermination appear committed to the 
stakeholder model, in which companies serve the interests of 
employees and other groups,316 rather than focusing solely on the 
maximization of shareholder wealth.317   
Executive and nonexecutive directors serve together on one-
tier boards, which have responsibility for making and executing 
corporate decisions.  Two-tier boards contain a management 
board, made up of executive directors who run the company 
directly, and a supervisory board of nonexecutives, who oversee 
the management board through the appointment, supervision, 
and removal of its members. 
Employee representation developed from the efforts of 
European trade unions to secure a direct say for their members 
in the affairs of the companies for which they worked.  Many 
Member States specify a level of employee representation 
required on the boards of different types of companies of different 
sizes.318  In Austria, for example, all joint stock companies and 
any limited liability company with more than three hundred 
employees must appoint employee representatives to one third of 
the seats on the supervisory board.319  In Hungary, any company 
with more than two-hundred employees must appoint employee 
representatives to one-third of the seats on the supervisory 
 
316 See, e.g., Friedrich Kübler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, 
11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 219–20 (2005) (discussing the stakeholder philosophy). 
317 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as 
the appropriate goal in American business circles.”). But see Revlon Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180, 185 (Del. 1986) (deferring 
to the business judgment of directors and seemingly requiring shareholder interests 
to be primary only in cases of a sale of control). 
318 Codetermination does not exist under Belgian, British, Bulgarian, Cypriot, 
Estonian, Italian, Latvian, or Lithuanian law. 
319 See Österreichischer Corporate Governance Kodex (Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance) art. 59 (2009), translated at http://www.wienerborse.at/ 
corporate/pdf/CG_Code_engl_2009draft_tr_fin.pdf. 
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board.320  Germany has the most rigorous requirements: 
employees occupy one-half of the supervisory board seats in large 
German companies.321 
1. Limited Benefits from One-Tier Option 
The choice of a one-tier board structure has not been 
significant for most companies.  Every participant in the study 
emphasized that large companies with employee representation 
would not adopt the SE in order to select a one-tier board:  A 
unitary board would place employee representatives alongside 
management, eliminating the barrier restricting them to a 
supervisory function.  In addition, the national laws of most  
Member States that require dual boards do not delineate how a 
one-tier board with employee representatives would operate, 
although Germany has explicitly legislated codetermination in 
one-tier SE companies.322  As a result, only smaller SE companies 
without employee representation have chosen a one-tier 
structure.323  They have done so to streamline their operations 
and to increase the power of their executive directors, aligning 
themselves more closely with companies from Member States 
without employee representation systems. 
Case 9: Plansee (Austria) 
Plansee, the closely-held Austrian metalworks company, 
used the SE to replace its two-tier board with a one-tier board, 
even though it had to increase the number of outside 
representatives on the board to do so.324  Plansee is part of a 
 
320 See Norbert Kluge, Europeanisation and Organised Labor: An Unsolved 
Dilemma 10 (Warwick Univ., Nov. 18–19, 2005), available at http://www. 
docstoc.com/docs/70565273/European-Company-Representation-Agreement.  
321 See Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeignehmer [Codetermination Act 
of 1976], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153, §§ 1, 7 (Ger.); Jan von Hein, Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place—German Codetermination Under Pressure, KYOTO J.L. & POL. 
May 2007, at 1, 2. 
322 The German Ministry of Economics and Labour has legislated 
codetermination in one-tier SE companies. See Gesetz der Implementierung der 
Regelung [SE-Ausführungsgesetz] [SEAG] [SE Implementation Act] § 6, Dec. 22, 
2004, BGBl I at 3675, available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de. 
323 For example, Mensch und Maschine Software, a German SE with 350 
employees and Sevic Systems, another Germany company with approximately 100 
employees. See ETUI, Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18 (select 
companies from the index). 
324 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53, company lawyers and officers, 
location not indentified (Mar. 19, 2008) (on file with author). 
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group of related companies; the other two are based in 
Luxembourg and have one-tier structures.325  Their managing 
directors previously served on the Supervisory Board of Plansee 
and could therefore control Plansee’s managing director.326  With 
the new, one-tier SE, all of the managing directors sit on the 
same level in all three companies.327  Plansee’s lawyers and 
officers say that the new organization appears more 
understandable to potential foreign investors and venture 
partners.328 
Case 10: PCC (Germany) 
PCC, the closely-held German energy company, also used the 
SE to establish a one-tier board.  The new structure has enabled 
the owner, who chairs the board, to strengthen his control of the 
company.  Before the conversion, a supervisory board of three 
outside directors ratified his decisions.329  The integrated board 
now has only one external member, a former representative to 
the supervisory board, who serves alongside the company’s 
owner, and a former member of the Management Board.330  The 
owner can more easily pass initiatives he proposes under the new 
arrangement.331 
Many companies describe the European branding that the 
SE offers as an additional benefit of conversion.332  PCC conducts 
extensive operations in Poland and has failed to complete two 
attempted takeovers of Polish chemical companies.333  The 
company blames the failures on a perception in Poland that 
 
325 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 59, company lawyers and officers, 
location not indentified (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with author). 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 59. 
329 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55, location not identified (Feb. 28, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 58, location not 
identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
330 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 58. 
331 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 58. 
332 See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, The Impact of the European Company (SE) on 
Legal Culture, 30 EUR. L. REV. 431, 435 (2005). For a theoretical analysis of what it 
means to give legal expression to identity, see Hans Lindahl, European Integration: 
Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries, 6 EUR. L.J. 239, 240–44 (2000). 
333 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55. 
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German corporate ownership threatens Polish employment.334  It 
has eagerly embraced the European status that the SE confers.335 
2. Survivability of Stakeholder Models 
While all German companies with employee representation 
have retained their two-tier boards after converting to the SE,336 
many of them have changed the size and composition of their 
supervisory boards.337  The SE Directive sets out a process for 
negotiating an agreement with workers that holds the potential 
to ease the demands of codetermination, even though the overall 
proportion of employee representation must remain the same.338  
The process, however, has proven both costly and difficult, and 
the companies that have undertaken it have not eliminated 
codetermination entirely, as they could have by reincorporating 
in a Member State that does not require it.339  Instead, the 
 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 For example, Allianz, BASF, Carthago Value Invest, Fresenius, Hager, Man 
Diesel, Max Boegl International, Porsche Holding, and Surteco. See ETUI, 
Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18 (select companies from the 
index). 
337 Using the political system to reduce the burden of German codetermination 
has not been possible. See, e.g., Angel R. Oquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other 
Side: Understanding Continental European Corporate Governance, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 975, 994 (2001). Since its enactment in 1952, the German Codetermination 
Act has been revised only once in 1976. According to Oquendo,  
[D]uring the debate that led to the enactment of the 1998 Corporate 
Control and Transparency Act, the acting Minister of Justice, businessmen, 
and legal experts unanimously supported reducing the size of the 
supervisory council. Nonetheless, unions and the Minister of Labor opposed 
this position. They eventually carried the day and blocked the reform.  
Id. 
338 SE Directive, supra note 10, § 2, art. 3(4). 
339 See Hanns-William Mülsch & Sven Piegsa, Excursus: Societas Europaea 
(“S.E.”), in EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 371, 372 (Karel Van Hulle & Harald Gesell 
eds., 2006). For Friedrich Kübler’s description of the process of using the SE to 
eliminate codetermination entirely, see Kübler, supra note 316, at 232–33.   
If we assume that a German stock corporation with more than 2000 
employees, Widget AG (“Widget”), wants to get rid of the German regime of 
worker participation on the supervisory board, it can merge with a British 
public limited company by forming a European Company, Widget SE, to be 
registered in the UK. The British partner in the merger could be small and 
unimportant; it could be a wholly owned subsidiary of Widget. This move 
will not free Widget from codetermination; it will have to negotiate with its 
employees and their union the agreement provided for in the Directive. . . . 
But two years after the date of the registration Widget can make a next 
move: now the firm is able to transform the (British) SE into a British plc. 
UK law does not impose any form of employee participation on companies. 
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companies in the study described codetermination as an 
important instrument of legitimacy for making decisions that 
adversely affect their employees.340  While more concentrated 
governance makes it faster for companies to make choices and 
implement them, codetermination facilitates consensus and 
defuses conflict.341  Labor unions have also begun to refocus their 
strategies in response to changes in the character of employee 
representation on boards. 
German codetermination rules include two important 
thresholds: companies with more than 500 employees but less 
than 2,000 must offer one third of their supervisory board seats 
to employee representatives;342 companies with more than 2,000 
employees must offer one half of the positions.343  In the latter 
case, not only employee codetermination but also the size of the 
supervisory board is fixed by mandatory law.344  As a result, 
German companies with fewer than 2,000 employees have 
converted to the SE in order to hold the proportion of employee 
 
Neither the SE-Regulation nor the SE-Directive require the preservation of 
codetermination in such a case.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
340 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5, 2007) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified 
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10, 
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 17, location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 25, location not 
identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
26, location not identified (Feb. 23, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on 
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified 
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38, 
location not identified (Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified (Mar. 18, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 45, location not identified (Feb. 15, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not 
identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
341 See, e.g., Teichmann, supra note 103, at 1333. 
342 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [One-Third Employee Representation Act], May 18, 
2004, BGBl. I at 974, last amended by Gesetz, July 30, 2009, BGBl. I. at 2479, § 1 
(Ger.). 
343 Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeignehmer [Codetermination Act of 
1976], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153 (Ger.). 
344 Id. II, § 7 (12 members in companies with a workforce not exceeding 10,000 
employees, 16 members in companies with a workforce not exceeding 20,000 
employees, 20 members in companies with a workforce exceeding 20,000 employees). 
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representation to the lower level.  Those with more than 2,000 
employees have used the SE to renegotiate the size of their 
supervisory boards, even though they have not been able to 
change the percentage of representation on the boards.345 
Case 11: Fresenius (Germany) 
Fresenius, the German healthcare company with a staff of 
1,000 in one hundred countries, converted to the SE in order to 
freeze the size of its supervisory board prior to reaching the 2,000 
employee threshold.346  The company expected to acquire a 
hospital business with many additional employees.347  Without 
the SE, it would have had to increase its supervisory board to 
twenty people from twelve.348 
Case 12: Allianz (Germany) 
With a workforce of more than 181,000, German 
codetermination rules mandate Allianz to provide half of its 
supervisory board seats to employees, but the SE allowed  
the company some changes.  The company followed the process 
set out in the SE directive.  It created a Special Negotiating Body 
of European employees349 to conduct negotiations with 
management.  The negotiations concluded with a reduction in the 
size of the supervisory board from twenty to twelve, albeit with 
the same fifty percent ratio of employees that German law 
requires.350  Whereas previously the employee representatives all 
 
345 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps 
on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 222 
(1999) (“Supervisory boards are unwieldy—commonly twenty seats.”); Mark J. Roe, 
German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 
200 (1999) (“[I]nformation flow to the board is poor, and the board is often too big 
and unwieldy to be effective.”). 
346 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 
2008) (on file with author). 
347 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not identified (Feb. 22, 
2008) (on file with author). 
348 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 31; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 
2008) (on file with author). 
349 See Agreement Concerning the Participation of Employees in Allianz SE, 
Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.allianz.com/en/investor_relations/ 
transactions/allianz_se/index1.html. 
350 Statutes of Allianz SE, Nov. 2007, § 6.1. 
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came from Germany, the new supervisory board includes a 
French and a British employee.351 
Companies with and without codetermination emphasized in 
interviews that smaller supervisory boards are easier to 
coordinate; fewer people can make decisions more quickly.  
Smaller numbers also improve confidentiality and save money 
that companies spend on board salaries.   
The cost of converting to the SE in order to make changes 
can be substantial, however, and some German companies have 
chosen simply to keep their original supervisory boards in place 
rather than enter the negotiations.352  Allianz paid a total of €95 
million to transform into an SE.353  The negotiation process can 
also pose challenges.354  BASF, the German chemical company, 
spent three months simply to nominate and elect thirty-two 
representatives to the Special Negotiating Body from the 
different countries in which it operates.355  All of the German 
companies that have converted to the SE have negotiated their 
representation for the entire six-month period that the directive 
allows.  For some companies, the “before and after”356 fallback 
principle has blocked any adjustments, despite what they have 
paid to initiate the process.357   
Legal uncertainties regarding what companies can negotiate 
also persist.  Allianz, as well as BASF, has asserted that a 
company’s articles of association determine the size of its 
supervisory board.358  Other legal commentators, however, have 
suggested that the size of the supervisory board can itself be 
 
351 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29; Interview 
with Anonymous Source No. 74. 
352 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not identified (Feb. 21, 
2008) (on file with author). 
353 Statutes of Allianz SE, Nov. 2007, § 18.1. 
354 See, e.g., Christoph Teichmann, Restructuring Companies in Europe: A 
German Perspective, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1325, 1335 (2004) (“To be sure, the 
negotiation procedure of the directive is burdensome and time consuming. Given the 
time pressure usually involved in international mergers and acquisitions, the 
negotiation period of six months provided for by the directive may fatally affect the 
dynamics of such transactions.”). 
355 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29. 
356 SE Directive, supra note 10, recital 18. 
357 SE Regulation, supra note 10, recital 18. 
358 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified (Mar. 18, 
2008) (on file with author).  
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established through the negotiation process with the Special 
Negotiating Body.  The legislation does not resolve the question 
clearly.359 
Labor unions are observing the developments closely.  The 
reduction in the size of Allianz’s supervisory board to twelve and 
the internationalization of its members tracks the experience of 
other large German companies that have made the transition to 
the SE.360  Some fear the form will weaken labor strength 
because employees from different Member States have conflicting 
interests and no common history of acting together.361  Others 
argue that internationalization enhances the legitimacy of 
employee representation because it reflects the actual 
composition of modern workforces.362 
According to the European Trade Union Institute for 
Research, Education, and Health and Safety (“ETUI”), the SE is 
forcing the creation of a more regional arrangement for union 
activities.363  The European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”) 
 
359 Hartmut Oetker, Unternehmensmitbestimmung in der SE Kraft 
Vereinbarung, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 1113 (2006); Interview 
with Anonymous Source No. 29.  
360 Man Diesel SE, for example, also reduced its Supervisory Board from twenty 
to ten and internationalized its employee representatives. See MAN Diesel, 
http://www.manbw.com/category_000449.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
361 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified (Dec. 10, 
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5, location not 
identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 12, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26, location not identified (Feb. 23, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 35, location not 
identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
38, location not identified (Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 41, location not identified (Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author).  
362 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10, location not identified (Dec. 7, 
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 14, location not 
identified (Jan. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 17, location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not 
identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 37, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author). 
363 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 
2008) (on file with author); see also EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 48 (Richard M. 
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the “national organizing vision” of American 
labor unions and the likelihood that “the emergence of vigorous competition across 
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has begun to intermediate in negotiations.  It provides 
translators to help workers act collectively.364  It also hopes to 
broaden the workers’ goals, as multinational companies pay 
decreasing  attention to national unions who refer to national 
rights under national law and pit national unions against each 
other.365 
The debate that the SE has prompted has also introduced 
new discussions about workers’ rights in countries with few 
protections of them.  Unionization among Member States varies 
widely.  The union density rate in Norway is nearly eighty 
percent, while in France it is only ten percent.366  Collective 
bargaining coverage in Slovenia is nearly complete, while in 
Lithuania it is only ten percent.367  Every country in which an SE 
operates, however, must provide representatives to the Special 
Negotiating Body,368 spreading awareness of bargaining power to 
countries that have not allowed it.  Sample Life Insurance Baltic 
SE, for example, trained candidates to the Special Negotiating 
Body from its Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian subsidiaries, 
where workers had not undertaken similar roles before.369 
In contrast to the Baltic States, Scandinavia has a strong 
tradition of union representation.  More than eighty percent of 
the Swedish population belongs to a union, and Swedish 
 
national borders within the European Community will turn the attention of 
European labor leaders to the Community level”). 
364 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 41. 
365 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 41; Interview with Anonymous 
Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
366 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 41. 
367 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY—PROSPECTS FOR WORKER BOARD-LEVEL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU 64–65 (Norbert Kluge & Michael Stollt eds., 
2006). 
368 SE Directive, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(a)–(b). 
369 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 6, location not identified (Dec. 6, 2007) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7, location not identified 
(Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26; 
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
41; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008) 
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 56, location not 
identified (Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 
57, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with 
Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 7, 2008) (on file with 
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74. 
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companies with more than twenty-five employees must appoint 
workers to their boards.370  In beginning the conversion process to 
the SE, Nordea and its principal union, the Confederation of the 
Nordic Bank, Finance and Insurance Unions (“NFU”), worked 
together closely to strengthen union organization at its 
subsidiaries.371  Only its Polish subsidiary had a trade union.372  
The NFU received a grant from the European Union to conduct a 
series of meetings at the subsidiaries, and Nordea’s directors 
participated.373  According to the directors, developing reliable 
employee contacts would benefit the company.374  
3. U.S. Comparison 
While the Supervisory Board structure does not exist in the 
U.S., national corporate governance debates have recently 
focused on the importance of outside monitors on company 
boards.375  Following Enron and other corporate scandals,376 in 
the Fall of 2003, the SEC approved new rules mandating 
publicly-listed companies to fill the majority of their board seats 
 
370 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY—PROSPECTS FOR WORKER BOARD-LEVEL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU, supra note 368; id. at 83–85. 
371 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7. 
372 Id.; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8, location not identified (Feb. 1, 
2008) (on file with author). 
373 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 8. 
374 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7; Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 8. See generally Nordea Annual Report 2006, at 7, available at 
http://www.finansforbundet.dk/images/unioninnordea/Generelt/union%20nordea%20
annual%20report%20endelig.pdf; Ammattiliitto Suora, EU Promotes Employee 
Influence in the European Company Nordea SE (Nov. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.suora.fi/Resource.phx/sivut/uutiset/u2004/eupromote.htx (discussing the 
Nordea SE Project). 
375 Cf. American Law Institute, Functions and Powers of the Board of Directors, 
in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.02, at 86–87 (1994). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007) (discussing the historical developments of 
independent directors in the United States). 
376 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. L. 1403, 1403 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance 
Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the 
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. 
Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul 
D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 9 (2002). 
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with independent directors.377  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002378 
also requires independent directors to serve on the audit 
committees of company boards.379  The rules reflect the 
assumption that outsiders oversee management more closely 
than insiders do and also act in the best interests of shareholders 
when they review corporate decisions.  Several empirical studies, 
however, have indicated that their appointment actually offers 
few benefits to shareholders, as measured by firm performance 
and stock price.380  Independent directors served in the majority 
of board positions at Enron.381 
Employee ownership has also become increasingly common.  
In 2006, twenty million Americans held shares in their workplace 
through a 401(k) plan, employee stock option plan, or direct stock 
grant, and roughly eleven million held stock options.382  Nearly 
thirty-five percent of employees of companies that issued stock 
owned its shares.383 
Unionization and attitudes towards unionization tend to be 
uniform in the U.S., although the western states have recently 
experienced higher growth in unionization384 than the rest of the 
country.385  Most labor unions belong to national umbrella 
 
377 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
378 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. 
379 Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j–l(m) 
(2006)). 
380 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between 
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 942 (1999) (“Most 
studies find little correlation, but a number of recent studies report evidence of a 
negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and firm 
performance—the exact opposite of conventional wisdom.”).   
381 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the 
New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley 3 (Harvard Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ., 
and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 416, 2003). 
382 National Center for Employee Ownership, Data Show Widespread Employee 
Ownership in U.S. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.nceo.org/library/widespread.html. 
383 See id. (stating the results of the 2006 General Social Survey). 
384 See AFL-CIO, Facts and Statistics: United States, Union Membership, 
available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/factsstats/factsstats.cfm (last visited Oct. 
10, 2010). The percentage of workers belonging to a union increased by 2.3% in 
Washington state and by 1.2% in California between 2000 and 2007. Id. In 
Tennessee and Illinois, it decreased by 3.8% each, within the same time period. Id.  
385 Unionization overall, however, has fallen considerably. According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, unionization dropped from 32% of the private sector in 
1956 to 7.8% in 2005. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
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organizations: the American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) or the Change to Win 
Federation, which separated from the AFL-CIO in 2005.386  The 
National Labor Relations Board, a federal agency, oversees the 
administration of the National Labor Relations Act, which has 
regulated unions operating in the private sector387 since 1935.388  
An array of federal389 and state law390 governs public-sector 
unions;391 state labor boards primarily oversee their operations.392 
The SE has contributed to the reorganization, but retained 
the presence, of employee representatives on company boards in 
Member States with codetermination systems and has also 
influenced the level at which labor unions direct their efforts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the U.S. and for Europe, the question of how to integrate 
economic markets at the regional level while retaining respect for 
local autonomy is critical, but each has chosen to navigate the 
 
Statistics: Union Membership by Industry, 2005, avaliable at 
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2006/jan/wk4/art02.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
386 The Service Employees International Union, the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, the United Food and Commercial Workers, and the United Farm 
Workers of America comprise Change to Win. Change to Win, About Us, 
http://www.changetowin.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).  
387 Section 152 excludes “the United States or any wholly owned Government 
corporation.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). The Civil Service Reform Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–35 (2006), enacted in 1978, provides federal public employees the 
right to collective bargaining. 
388 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat. 
449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69). 
389 Title 29 of the C.F.R. enforces Federal labor laws. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1.1 
(2010). The Department of Labor enforces more than 180 employment and labor 
laws. The Office of Labor-Management Standards of the U.S. Department of Labor 
enforces the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. See 
29 U.S.C. § 435; 29 C.F.R. § 70.53. The Civil Service Reform Act and its 
implementing regulations cover unions representing federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7101. 
390 Wisconsin became the first state to pass a statute protecting the rights of 
public employees to engage in collective bargaining in 1959. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, 
PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 
1900–1962, at 158 (2004). 
391 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.080 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-271 
(West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 2 (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4117.03 (West 2010).  
392 See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1 to /27 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4117.02 (West 2010) (requiring a three-member labor board); N.Y. CIV. SERV. 
LAW §§ 200–14 (McKinney 2010). 
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tensions arising from multi-level governance in different ways.  
Companies clamor for a single set of rules to follow, as early 
support in the U.S. for mutual recognition of companies by the 
states and the demand for first-order incorporations in the UK by 
European companies has demonstrated.  Several companies in 
the study called for a global corporate form, even more ambitious 
than the SE’s protracted attempt to create a unified body of 
European corporate law.393 
Because the competition between the states over corporate 
law has largely been won by Delaware, the U.S. experience 
reflects the imposition of rules pre-chosen by a single legislator, 
either Delaware or the federal government.394  When the federal 
government has intervened in matters of corporate regulation, it 
has done so completely,395 using the doctrine of preemption396 to 
 
393 Interview with Anonymous Source No. 16, location not identified (Dec. 12, 
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not 
identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source 
No. 70, location not identified (Mar. 17, 2008) (on file with author); see also A. Claire 
Cutler, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2003); Filip De Ly, Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): 
Globalisation and International Self-Regulation, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE 
LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 159 (Richard P. Appelbaum et 
al. eds., 2001); Jean-Phillippe Robé, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a 
Pluralistic Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 45, 68–71 (G. Teubner 
ed., 1997) (discussing globalization of business and aspirations to keep it form 
national regulatory restraints). But see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther 
Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation 
of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004). 
394 See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political 
Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 820 (2004) (“[T]he dominant 
tendency in U.S. jurisprudence has been to view the projects of federal and state 
governance as essentially distinct and to solve intergovernmental conflicts by trying 
to establish clear boundaries between the two.”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. 
Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause 
Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1236–52 (2003). 
395 For calls for a less “dualistic” approach to U.S. federalism and suggesting 
new models such as “dynamic federalism,” “interactive federalism,” and “cooperative 
federalism,” see, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in 
COMPETITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 80–83 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Renee Jones, Does Federalism Matter?: 
Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
879 (2006); Schapiro, supra note 2.  
396 The federal preemption doctrine disallows state laws that are inconsistent 
with federal legislation or which impinge on areas in which Congress has already 
“occupied the field” with legislation. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Reviving 
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 
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exclude the states from the field.397  Democratic processes and 
direct representation support a powerful federal Congress, and 
the political consensus it embodies offers it the possibility to 
implement swift, radical change.398  In the absence of any 
competitor to the federal government, however, robust federal 
legislation threatens to succumb to rent-seeking or over-reaction.  
Many commentators, for example, view the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
as the misguided result of a rush by Congress to respond to 
public anxiety.399  They advocate a more measured process of 
experimentation and learning, in order to strike a more efficient 
balance between the deterrence of corporate fraud and the cost of 
corporate compliance. 
Reflecting its history and also by virtue of political necessity, 
the EU has had to preserve far more diversity in national laws 
from the outset of its regional regulatory initiatives.  It has been 
faced with the escalating demands of businesses for measures 
easing their operations across European borders, as well as 
recent decisions by the European Court of Justice.  As a result, 
the EU has begun to chart a new relationship between an upper-
level regulatory authority and those of the individual Member 
States different from the U.S. federalist arrangement.400  Lacking 
 
CAL. L. REV. 485, 526 n.203 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “promiscuous 
use” of preemption); Alison Cassady, Tying the Hands of States: The Impact of 
Federal Preemption on State Problem-Solvers, at 2 (National Association of State 
PIRGS, July 2004) (“[F]ederal preemption has often tied the hands of state 
legislators and regulators eager to solve problems facing their constituents”). Under 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, however, federal regulatory agencies may not 
unilaterally preempt state law; they require clear congressional authorization to do 
so. 905 F.2d 406, 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
397 Where state and federal spheres of regulation coexist, such as proxy 
regulation, they hew self-consciously to a dualistic notion of federalism, in which the 
federal securities laws may govern disclosure and procedure but may not intrude 
into state law areas of corporate governance. 
398 Compare Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282, 
291 (1995) (“The European public power is not one that derives from the people, but 
one mediated through States. Since the Treaties thus have not an internal but an 
external reference point, they are also not the expression of a society’s self-
determination as to the form and objectives of its political unity.”), with PHILIPPE C. 
SCHMITTER, HOW TO DEMOCRATIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION . . . AND WHY BOTHER? 
(2000). 
399 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528, 1543–44 (2005). 
400 See, e.g., Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at 
First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 515, 516 (2001) (“[T]he long-range tendency has been 
toward more integration in a complex pattern of shared governance . . . .”). 
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a founding integrative myth similar to the U.S.,401 and reflecting 
its nature as a composite union of mature nations, its approach 
has been more indirect and subtle402:  The history of the EU has 
been marked by covert attempts to offer incremental possibilities 
for economic integration, with minimal interference in the legal 
systems of its Member States.403  The legislative methodology of 
the SE parallels the genesis of the EU and the long-standing 
debates over the powers it should carry over local jurisdictions. 
The SE has tested the ability of the European Member 
States to pool their authority over corporate law.  After decades 
of negotiation, the EU reached a compromise that, instead of 
expropriating the Member States, maintains divergences in their 
legal systems by creating a simple framework with minimal 
European law.  In this way, it secured from Member States their 
support for the SE both with and without codetermination 
systems, an area in which true consensus was unlikely ever to 
emerge.  In the five years since the agreement, a growing number 
of companies from a variety of industries have navigated 
substantial legal uncertainties and expended significant 
investments to convert to the new form.  Most companies have 
done so to streamline their operations and to generate regulatory 
efficiencies through centralized branch structures.  A few have 
used it to gain flexibility for headquarters relocation, or for 
organization of their boards of directors. 
The remaining diversity in the laws and regulatory 
techniques of the Member States has facilitated a process in 
which companies can express their preferences for particular 
systems and can bring about convergence without the need for ex 
 
401 See EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON 
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 16 (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) 
(stating that European Commission members “do not arrive in office with any 
manifesto or programme other than what is in the EEC Treaty”). 
402 See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 343, 344 (1994); Eric Stein, Democracy Beyond Nation-State: 
On World Trade Organization and European Union 10 (University of Georgia School 
of Law Occassional Paper Series, 2002), available at http://digitalcommons. 
law.uga.edu/rusk_oc/2 (“Georg Ress calls the [European] Council the Kremlin of the 
West.”). See also generally OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(Veerle Deckmyn & Ian Thomson eds., 1998). 
403 See, e.g., Christian Joerges, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism’—Two Defences, 8 
EUR. L.J. 133, 149–50 (2002) (discussing the “legitimacy of transnational governance 
which can neither be derived from national constitutional law nor from a 
supranational order of superior validity,” becoming, therefore, “the core and 
enduring problem of European law”). 
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ante choices by a centralized regulator.  The EU unveiled the SE 
in the absence of true European corporate law or corporate 
tribunals.  While use of the form has been selective, and it has 
captured the interest only of selected companies, it has become a 
pilot project for what European corporate law could represent 
and pointed to the sectors and Member States that are most 
likely to want it.  
This discovery model, termed “reflexive harmonization,”404 
provides a useful building block for U.S. cross-border regulatory 
efforts, in areas where international agreement is impossible.405  
Pressure to transcend national boundaries and address emerging 
transatlantic challenges has intensified in the U.S.406  The 
current crisis in the credit markets underscores the need for 
 
404 See supra note 19. 
405 See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at xviii. 
The United States and the European Union increasingly collaborate on a 
range of regulatory issues in an effort to remove non-tariff barriers and 
thus to facilitate trade. For instance, bilateral regulatory harmonization 
and mutual recognition efforts have been undertaken by the United States 
and the European Union in the context of the New Transatlantic Agenda. 
The two blocks have agreed to consult each other in the early stages of 
drafting regulations and to rely to a greater extent on each other’s technical 
resources and expertise. Recent global mergers such as Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas, WorldCom/MCI, and Daimler/Chrysler have also illustrated the 
growing level of cooperation between the US Department of Justice and the 
European Commission on antitrust matters. 
Id. at 41 (internal citations omitted); see also EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 399 (Richard M. 
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) (“More frequent will be the determination—especially in 
bank and capital market law—that a global solution would be even better than a 
European one . . . . [I]n this case the clear choice would be a regional 
solution . . . coupled so far as possible with . . . multilateral regulation . . . .”). But see 
Stephan, supra note 29, at 788.  
The project of unifying substantive international commercial law . . . . has 
its own political economy with predictable and unattractive implications for 
what it produces. International unification instruments display a strong 
tendency either to compromise legal certainty or to advance the agendas of 
interest groups. In either case they offer no obvious gains as compared to 
rules produced through the national legislative process. 
Id. 
406 See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at x (“[T]he push toward open markets 
and higher degrees of international economic interdependence seems inexorable”). 
On the internationalization of securities markets and the resulting legal 
interdependence, see, for example, Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: 
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 564 (1998). 
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international regulatory techniques, as securitization and 
globalization carry business activities farther across national 
frontiers.407  Mechanisms inspired by the pragmatic, learning-by-
doing approach in Europe would facilitate compromise in areas 
where consensus is difficult and would also constrain the 
pendulum-like swings that appear to characterize the current 
national character. 
Progress in this direction, however, must consider carefully 
the consequences of allowing companies to select and deselect the 
rules according to which they will operate.  Rather than 
triggering countries to compete to offer attractive legal regimes, 
companies themselves are actively using the SE to press for more 
streamlined regulation and harmonized law.  Companies want to 
take full advantage of intergrated markets, to improve their 
position by reducing costs and gaining regulatory predictability.  
The companies are several steps ahead of the Member Sates 
themselves, which struggle to cooperate to build cross-border 
regulatory systems.  The Member States’ desire to foster an 
integrated market conflicts with their other prudential concerns, 
such as maintaining regulatory control and retaining or avoiding 
employee representation on boards.  Where they can, companies 
are bypassing the Member States’ inability to coordinate cross-
border regulation by carrying out their own restructuring and 
moving directly to regulation by a single Member State. 
The approach has placed tremendous power in the hands of 
companies to choose the systems around which company law will 
begin to converge in Europe.  Facilitating their choices may 
conflict with protecting the interests of other stakeholders.  
Necessary considerations include whether the ability of workers 
to organize is helped or harmed by the transformation of their 
companies to the SE, the effect of reorganization on creditors and 
on managers, and whether SE companies increase systemic risk 
in the markets due to reduced regulation or decrease it by 
adopting streamlined structures that are more easily monitored 
by company directors.   
Companies that convert to the SE will provide measurable 
answers to these and other questions, useful for evaluating 
Europe’s approach to developing a centralized, transnational 
 
407 See, e.g., Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating 
Europe and a Globalising World, 6 EUR. L.J. 277, 277 (2000). 
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market, in spite of the caution the legislation reflects.  The SE 
constitutes a valuable test case for gauging the viability of 
unified corporate identities and international regulatory regimes.  
It should be of significant relevance to legislators and 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. 
